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 Secretary Geithner’s remarks highlight a fundamental policy-
concern about the recent financial system turmoil – “systemic risk”.   Not 
only have parties to various financial transactions incurred considerable 
losses, but so have third parties.  The costs of those transactions thus appear 
to have spread from immediately interested parties, where market 
discipline tends to work well, to the social domain, where more centrally 
developed laws and regulations can do better.  As far as concerns for this 
type of spillover go, policymakers appear well motivated in calling for a 
systemic risk regulator that might check the potential for future bouts of 
financial contagion.1 
Before we can better manage systemic risk, however, we need a 
forward-looking measure of it.  A number of authoritative commentators 
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 1. Widespread calls for improved systemic risk regulation include, VIRAL ACHARYA & 
MATTHEW RICHARDSON, RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED 
SYSTEM (2009); ENRICO PEROTTI & JAVIER SUAREZ, CENTRE ECON. POL’Y RESEARCH, 
LIQUIDITY INSURANCE FOR SYSTEMIC CRISES (2009); and Lasse Pedersen & Nouriel Roubini, 
A Proposal to Prevent Wholesale Financial Failure, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4d0add58-ee27-11dd-b791-
0000779fd2ac.html?catid=9&SID=a527e1b4ae044f959a1101c9c34ccb2c.  In addition, the 
Obama Administration recently proposed significant regulatory reforms that provide for a 
systemic risk regulator.  See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A 
NEW FOUNDATION (2009), http://financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf 
(recommending regulatory changes); see also Jon Hilsenrath, The Task of Taming Highs 
and Low, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124526883036724391.html (describing proposed regulatory 
changes and potential consequences). 
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have made similar observations.  For example, Michael Spence (a Nobel 
Laureate in economics) recently applauded British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown’s call for an “an early warning system” (an idea that subsequently 
gained traction in G-20 meetings) but also cautioned that an adequate 
measure of systemic risk is not yet available.2  Thomas Cooley and Ingo 
Walter (dean and vice dean, respectively, at New York University’s Stern 
School of Business) similarly argued that “[t]he key to restoring stability 
and robustness is to recognize, measure and price the systemic risk created 
by private financial activities. . . .”3  And testifying before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Federal Reserve 
Board Governor, Daniel K. Tarullo, identified several tools which would 
strengthen administrative and Congressional efforts to productively manage 
systemic risk, including “better and more formal mechanisms . . . to help 
identify, monitor, and address potential or emerging systemic risks across 
the financial system as a whole . . . .”4 
Taking these observations as motivation, we consider how an 
information market security might provide an early warning of systemic 
risk.  This security would build on the fundamental nature of systemic risk 
referred to by Secretary Geithner.  A legitimate policy concern is that 
parties to financial transactions need not face the full costs of their actions 
but can instead pass a considerable portion of those costs onto third 
parties.5  When participants in a transaction create such external effects 
they necessarily draw the performance of third party businesses closer to 
their own.  A security that derives from how closely the performance of 
“third party businesses” and “financially dependent businesses” correlates 
 
 2. Spence observed that this early warning system “is a good idea, but acting on it will 
require a nontrivial extension of our current knowledge and capabilities.  We have been 
operating with indicators that, while relevant, do not add up to a complete picture of 
systemic risk. . . .”  A. Michael Spence, Lessons from the crisis, PIMCO VIEWPOINTS, Nov. 
2008, 
http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Viewpoints/2008/Viewpoints+Lessons+from+the+Crisis+S
pence+November+2008.htm. 
 3. Thomas Cooley & Ingo Walter, Financial Polluters Need to Pay, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 
12, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_and&sid=ajotwjbI
IZSM. 
 4. Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Daniel K. 
Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a915ab5
3-be05-457e-8dc6-bf12d25d9d6f. 
 5. Ronald Coase carefully addressed the question of when the law can productively 
address this type of problem.  Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 
(1960).  We argue below that Coase’s conditions are met in the case of systemic risk, and 
that an information market contract that provides an early warning about that risk can 
augment more conventional regulatory mechanisms. 
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might thus reveal information about the nature of systemic risk in real-time, 
and do so in a more productive manner than is currently available to 
regulators and market participants.6 
The remainder of our article evaluates how this kind of security can 
work in principle, and offers a statistical illustration and legal/regulatory 
review of how it can work in practice.  The article’s theory ultimately 
derives from the Coase theorem, which shows that if the cost of transacting 
is negligible, then the law’s first order effect is on distribution rather than 
efficiency.7  The theorem’s contrapositive, then, is that laws can improve 
economic performance only when the cost of transacting is considerable.  
Viewed in this light, because parties to a financial transaction face fewer 
search, bargaining, and enforcement costs (transaction costs) than do 
affected third parties, the law has an opportunity to productively address 
systemic risk. 
Our question then becomes how the law can do better at fulfilling this 
opportunity.  A standard approach is to coarsely impose capital 
requirements, and thus increase the exposure of transacting parties to the 
costs of their own actions.  But while prescriptive capital requirements can 
mitigate moral hazard, they can also take away leverage that may be 
necessary to pursue truly productive projects.  Ideally, then, a social 
planner would allow more leverage in systemically “safe” times (when the 
relative cost of foregoing good projects is high) and demand more stringent 
capital requirements as the risk of systemic crisis increases (when the 
relative cost of allowing external effects is high).  The derivative security 
that we consider in this article would provide a regulator with the real-time 
information necessary to implement such a standard, and thus facilitate a 
productive refinement of the coarse requirements now used to govern the 
financial sector. 
It would also offer a productive refinement to the conventional 
regulatory tool of “bank” examination.  Relative to market participants, for 
example, bank examiners find themselves working at a distance from 
 
 6. In other words, if the fundamental concern about systemic risk is the ability of 
parties to enjoy the benefits of a transaction and pass the costs off to others, then the 
performance of third parties should track more closely with that of transacting parties when 
the external effects of financial activity grow stronger.  Myron Scholes (a Nobel Laureate in 
economics) anticipated how such a measure can be informative, noting that “at times of 
crisis, things that were seemingly unrelated all of a sudden become related.”  Best of 
Bloomberg on the Economy with Tom Keene, Scholes, Ross, Merton Discuss Credit Crisis, 
Hedge Funds (Internet Podcast May 16, 2008) (on file with authors). 
 7. See Coase, supra note 5, at 8 (“It is necessary to know whether the damaging 
business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial 
delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them.  
But the ultimate result (which maximises [sic] the value of production) is independent of the 
legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.”). 
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information about who is (and is not) affected by financial transactions.  
Our derivative security would address this difficulty by directly soliciting 
market participants (those who are closest to the information of interest), 
and do so in a manner that encourages truthful revelation of pertinent 
information.8  At the same time, that solicitation would allow participants 
to retain a considerable level of anonymity, and may thus produce 
regulatory-relevant information (i.e., the exposure of third parties to 
financial transactions) without putting productive trade secrets of financial 
firms at undue risk (as necessarily intrusive “bank” examination might do) 
or discouraging legitimate whistle-blowers. 
In this theoretical light, an information market contract appears 
capable as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism in the systemic regulator’s 
toolbox.  To illustrate how such a contract might work in practice, we build 
on Raghuram Rajan’s and Luigi Zingales’ seminal comparison of how 
finance dependent firms (those who are likely to transact with a financial 
services enterprise) perform relative to firms that are less reliant on external 
finance (firms that are insensitive to the financial service sector’s health, 
except for their exposure to the external effects of financial transactions).9  
In particular, we find that daily stock market returns of these otherwise 
very different firms begin to exhibit historically strong correlations in the 
third quarter of 2007 and continue to do so through the first quarter of 2009 
(the end of our dataset).  We also offer corroborating evidence from 
analyzing the text of financial news that this heightened correlation reflects 
systemic risk per se and not some unrelated force.  Finally, we show how 
an information market contract that derives from this correlation might 
provide an early warning to systemic risk regulators (as well as market 
participants), and conclude by highlighting the political obstacles that such 
a contract might confront, even if the potential that it shows here proves to 
be robust. 
I. HISTORY OF THE CRISIS (SO FAR) 
 A diverse array of factors has resulted in the most severe economic 
and financial contraction since the Great Depression.  Many agree, 
however, that financial sector regulators were slow to identify and address 
the systemic nature of the crisis.  A surplus of liquidity flowed through 
 
 8. In short, relative to alternative methods of soliciting information (e.g., surveys of 
economists), an information market rewards good information and punishes bad 
information, and can thus encourage a self-selection of those with the best information to 
reveal what they know in a truthful manner. 
 9. See Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (examining the relationship between developed financial markets 
and business growth). 
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U.S. capital markets over much of the last decade.  Innovations in mortgage 
securitization directed much of this capital into real estate.  High valuations 
in housing proved excessive, and prices declined as investment flowed 
from the sector.  Most importantly, the effects of the contraction proved 
systemic as the quality of banks’ securitized investments deteriorated.  
Market incentives proved insufficient to fully discipline investor risk-
taking in the presence of risk-sharing through financial intermediation.  
And public regulators failed to identify where market inefficiencies would 
result in systemic consequences. 
 Economists continue to debate the source of excess liquidity that 
flowed into housing over the decade.  Some suggest that a glut of savings 
in emerging nations helped to finance excessive investment in the U.S.10  In 
this view, liberalized global financial markets allowed investors from fast-
growing emerging market economies to access more stable investment 
opportunities in developed nations.  Investor protections in the established 
institutional environments of mature democracies made them desirable 
places to store financial capital.  In fact, net inflows of foreign capital to the 
U.S. rose from approximately two percent of GDP in 1997 to six percent of 
GDP in 2006.11 
 Others suggest the principal source of excess liquidity was overly 
accommodative monetary policy.12  Concurrent with the rise in foreign 
savings, the Federal Reserve reduced interest rates in order to combat the 
effects of the 2001 recession.  The target rate for Federal Funds, the 
overnight, inter-bank lending rate, was reduced from 6.5 percent at the 
beginning of 2001 to one percent in mid 2003, where it remained for 
another 12 months.13  Even more importantly, the Federal Funds rate target 
remained below conventional measures of neutrality.14  Because the Fed 
 
 10. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Speech at the Bundesbank Lecture, Global Imbalances: Recent Developments and Prospects 
(Sep. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070911a.htm (describing 
increasing investment from developing nations). 
 11. Authors’ calculations.  Data from U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), available at http://www.bea.gov/, retrieved July 12, 2009.  The balance of 
payments identity requires that a current account, or trade, deficit be offset by a foreign 
capital flow surplus of the same magnitude. 
 12. See, e.g., John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and Policy Responses: An Empirical 
Analysis of What Went Wrong (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14631, 
Jan. 2009) (examining the relationship between monetary policy and economic cycles). 
 13. FED. RESERVE BD., OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm (last visited February 22, 2010). 
 14. See John B. Taylor, Professor of Econ., Stanford Univ., and Senior Fellow, Hoover 
Inst., Remarks at Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City Symposium on Housing, Housing 
Finance, and Monetary Policy   (Sept. 1, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/Housing%20and%20Monetary%20Policy--Taylor--
Jackson%20Hole%202007.pdf). 
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implements monetary policy through purchases and sales of Treasury 
securities,15 yields on the safest investments declined as foreign capital 
inflows continued apace. 
 Whatever the source of excess liquidity, innovations in mortgage 
securitization appeared to provide investors with an opportunity for greater 
returns in the historically low-risk U.S. housing market.  Both public and 
private issuers responded to the growing demand for housing-related 
investment.  Outstanding balances of total mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) in the U.S. averaged $4.8 trillion in 2004, or 41 percent of GDP, 
and by the end of 2007, MBS balances had grown to $7.4 trillion, or 54 
percent of GDP.16  Innovation by private mortgage conduits accounted for 
much of the growth in mortgage securitization.  Though they only 
represented 30 percent of total balances in mortgage pools and trusts in 
2004, private conduits accounted for 58 percent of the growth in securitized 
mortgage balances through 2007.17  Government sponsored enterprise 
(GSE) conduits, however, still accounted for 60 percent of MBS balances 
in 2007.18  Moreover, GSE securitization continued to grow through 2008, 
as the severity of the crisis came into relief.19 
 Excess liquidity and financial innovation also had significant 
consequences for business finance.  Outstanding balances of asset-backed 
commercial paper in the U.S. averaged $0.7 trillion in 2004, or six percent 
of GDP.20  Asset-backed commercial paper peaked in early August of 2007 
at $1.2 trillion, or nine percent of GDP.21  Over that same period, 
outstanding balances of unsecured commercial paper for both nonfinancial 
 
 15. See Cheryl L. Edwards, Open Market Operations in the 1990’s, 1997 FED. RESERVE 
BULL. 859 (1997) (describing the mechanisms by which the Federal Reserve implements its 
money policies). 
 16. Authors’ calculations.  GDP data from: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Econ. 
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=5&ViewSeries=NO&
Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2004&
LastYear=2005&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid [hereinafter National 
Income] (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).  Mortgage debt data from: Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/mortoutstand20090331.ht
m [hereinafter Mortgage Debt Outstanding] (last visited February 22, 2010). 
 17. National Income, supra note 16; Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 17. 
 18. National Income, supra note 16; Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 17. 
 19. National Income, supra note 16; Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 17. 
 20. Asset backed commercial paper are loans used for short-term financing needs 
(typically between 90 and 120 days) and secured by physical assets, such as traded 
receivables.  Authors’ calculations from commercial paper data from Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors data download program.  Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Commercial Paper Rates and Outstandings, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/ 
[hereinafter Commercial Paper Rates] (data retrieved July 14, 2009). 
 21. Id. 
BEVILLEFINAL 6/10/2010  10:51:09 AM 
2010] PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK 855 
 
and financial firms also rose, growing 69 percent and 44 percent, 
respectively.22 
 Eventually, credit levels proved to be unsustainable, resulting in 
reverberations between real and financial activity.  The National 
Association of Home Builders (NAHB)/Wells Fargo Housing Market index 
peaked in June of 2005.23  This measure would decline by 42 percent over 
the following 12 months, and an additional 28 percent by the summer of 
2007.24  The Case-Shiller National Home Price Index would peak in the 
second quarter of 2006,25 and home foreclosure activity would rise 75 
percent in 2007.26 
 Real businesses’ activity would also suffer the consequences of the 
credit market freeze-up.  Total commercial paper outstanding would 
contract by 20 percent over the last five months of 2008.27  This decline 
was entirely attributable to a contraction in nonfinancial commercial paper 
(down 14 percent) and asset-backed commercial paper (down 37 percent).28 
 In the first quarter of 2007, loan loss provisions at FDIC-insured 
banks posted their largest increase in since 2002, increasing by $3.2 billion 
from 2006.29  The systemic implications became apparent as large subprime 
lenders warned of significant losses.30  On June 16, Merrill Lynch seized 
$400 million in assets of a Bear Stearns fund that incurred heavy losses in 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See National Association of Home Builders, NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market 
Index (Historical Data), 
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?sectionID=134&genericContentID=530 (last visited Feb. 
5, 2010) (displaying data).  NAHB/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index is based on a 
monthly survey of NAHB members.  The survey measures the strength of the market for 
new, single-family homes. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Standard & Poors, S&P/Case Schiller National Home Price Index, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/csnational_value_052619.xls (last visited 
February 22, 2010).  The Case-Shiller Home Price Indices are constant-quality indexes 
derived from data on repeat sales of existing homes.  The national index is a composite of 
regional single-family home price indices. 
 26. Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007 
(Jan. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/PressRelease.aspx?channelid=9&ItemID=3
988. 
 27. Authors’ calculations.  For data, see Commercial Paper Rates, supra note 21. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Quarterly Banking Profile, FDIC Q., First Q. 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2007mar/qbp.pdf.  The report noted that net charge-offs rose 48.4 
percent from the first quarter of 2006, increasing in most loan categories. Id. at 2. The report 
also noted that “net charge-offs of 1-4 family residential mortgage loans were up by $268 
million (93.2%) [from year ago levels].”  Id. 
 30. See Timeline: Subprime Losses, BBC NEWS ONLINE, May 19, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7096845.stm (chronologically representing events). 
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mortgage-backed investments.31  When markets opened two days later, the 
TED spread, a headline measure of overnight default risk, rose to nearly 84 
basis points.32  Historically, the TED spread had remained under 50 basis 
points.33  However, on broader concerns about banks’ mortgage investment 
exposure, the TED spread would surge to 240 basis points on August 20.34  
The measure would remain above 75 basis points over the next 12 months, 
before peaking at 464 basis points in October of 2008.35 
 Some of the excesses in credit markets may have been attributable 
to social policy that encouraged higher-risk lending.  For example, the 
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 
required the Department of Housing and Urban Development to establish 
goals encouraging GSEs to promote home ownership among low-income 
borrowers and borrowers in historically underserved areas.36  Research 
suggests these goals may have increased mortgage lending to low- and 
moderate-income households, primarily in 1998.37 
 However, credit market excesses also revealed weaknesses in the 
capacity for decentralized markets to manage lending risks.  If transactions 
costs are significant, securitization can affect how loans are managed once 
risks are realized.  Loans in default that are held by lenders are more likely 
to be restructured, as lenders often find renegotiation preferable to 
foreclosure.  However, varied interests among the large number of parties 
 
 31. Merrill Lynch Seizes Bear Stearns Fund Assets, REUTERS, June 16, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/idUSN1631437620070618. 
 32. Bloomberg.com TED Spread Charts, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/cbuilder?ticker1=.TEDSP%3AIND (last visited Jan. 27, 
2010).  The TED spread is defined as the difference between the yields on the three-month 
U.S. Treasury Bill and the three-month London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR).  The 
former represents a risk-free rate; latter represents the rate that banks charge for lending 
over the same term.  Thus, the difference is viewed as a measure of credit risk of large 
financial institutions that manage liquidity by borrowing funds at LIBOR. 
 33. Posting of James Hamilton to Econbrowser, Understanding the TED Spread, 
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2008/09/understanding_t.html (Sept. 28, 2008, 
21:09). 
 34. Bloomberg.com TED Spread Charts, supra note 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 § 
1332, Pub. L. No. 102-550 § 1332 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.S. § 4562 (LexisNexis 
2010)); see also OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT’S 
REGULATION OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (FANNIE MAE) AND THE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION (FREDDIE MAC) (1995). 
 37. Brent W. Ambrose & Thomas G. Thibodeau, Have the GSE Affordable Housing 
Goals Increased the Supply of Mortgage Credit?, 34 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 263, 271 
(2004) (finding “a limited relationship between mortgage volume and the proportion of 
underserved census tracts in an MSA . . . [as suggested by] a significantly positive 
relationship between the level of mortgage activity and the purchase of seasoned loans by 
the GSEs.”). 
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to a securitized loan make them much more costly to restructure.38  
Sufficiently large financial institutions have an incentive to undertake 
excessive risks if they account for implicit insurance from a systemic risk 
regulator concerned that complex intermediation cannot be quickly 
unwound. 
 In fact, recent research suggests that mortgage securitization 
diminished incentives for lenders to screen borrowers.39  Indeed, as 
mortgage securitization grew, subprime mortgage lending expanded 
contemporaneously with flat and declining income among subprime 
borrowers.40  Conversely, lenders devote more effort to assessing the risks 
of loans they hold on their books.  Large, complex financial intermediaries 
will discount risk if they anticipate that the regulatory authority will have 
an incentive to intervene in the event of correlated loan losses. 
 Public regulation appears to have failed as well where market 
discipline was lacking.  Some accounts suggest that financial regulators 
may have been “captured” by industry interest, resulting in less stringent 
regulatory controls and enforcement.41  Others suggest that regulators 
adopted more flexible standards in a failed attempt “to compensate for 
earlier deregulatory efforts by Congress that had left the SEC unable to 
 
 38. See Joseph Stiglitz, Houses of Cards, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Oct. 9, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/oct/09/housesofcards. 
 39. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?  Evidence 
from Subprime Loans (EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137.  The authors use the GSE-established 620 FICO credit 
score underwriting cut-off in order to distinguish securitizeable and non-securitizeable loans 
of similar riskiness.  Id. at 2.  They find that portfolios of subprime mortgage loans that are 
more likely to be securitized are 10 to 25 percent more likely to default than are portfolios 
of similarly risky subprime mortgage loans that are less likely to have been securitized.  Id. 
at 28. 
 40. See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: 
Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis (Working Paper Series, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304.  The authors study changes in mortgage lending by zip 
code.  They report that “[t]he expansion in mortgage credit from 2002 to 2005 to subprime 
zip codes occurs despite sharply declining relative (and in some cases absolute) income 
growth in these neighborhoods.  In fact, 2002 to 2005 is the only period in the last eighteen 
years when income and mortgage credit growth are negatively correlated.”  Id. at Abstract.  
Most importantly for the present interest, the authors also find that the dissociation of 
income growth from subprime credit growth is closely correlated with the increase in 
securitization of subprime mortgages.  Id. 
 41. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1 (examining investment banks’ successful efforts to lobby 
the SEC to reduce the net capital rule, which would allow banks to lend capital that was then 
held in reserve against expected loan and investment losses).  The author suggests that 
oversight of the new capital regime may have been inadequate:  “[t]he commission assigned 
seven people to examine the parent companies – which . . . controlled financial . . . assets of 
more than $4 trillion [in 2007]. . . .  And [from early 2007 through September 2008], the 
office had not completed a single inspection . . . .”  Id. 
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monitor the overall financial position and risk management practices of the 
parent companies controlling . . . investment banks.”42  In either case, 
public regulation proved to be an inadequate safeguard to failures of market 
discipline that were exposed when excess liquidity and public policy 
encouraged high-risk lending and borrowing. 
II. MARKET DISCIPLINE WON’T STOP “FINANCIAL POLLUTERS”, AND 
CURRENT REGULATIONS FALL SHORT OF PRACTICAL IDEALS 
A. Markets Work, At Least Where Laws Lower Transactions Costs 
In a series of influential articles, Nobel Laureate in economics Ronald 
Coase showed that the visible hand of the law (i.e., governance 
mechanisms, such as public laws, regulations, or business associations) 
improves economic performance (as measured by total welfare) only 
through its ability to reduce transaction costs.43  These costs refer to 
resources that individuals must forego while searching for suitable trading 
partners, bargaining over the terms of an exchange, and enforcing those 
terms.  And a wealth of economic theory and evidence supports the 
hypothesis that “free markets” work better when the law provides a low-
transaction-cost environment.  The Federal Reserve Act of 1913, for 
example, provides a foundation for sound monetary policy and thus 
economizes on costs from searching for suitable trading partners when a 
“double coincidence of wants” is necessary for economic exchange.44  
Markets also work better when competition policy facilitates trades that are 
mutually beneficial, except for the bargaining costs that either party would 
incur to productively address the other’s market power.45  And laws that 
 
 42. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Analyzing the Credit Crisis: Was the SEC Missing in 
Action? N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 2008, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1202426495544.  The author argues that 
investment banks lobbied the SEC for oversight in order to avoid regulation under the 
European Union Financial Conglomerates Directive, adopted in 2002. Id.  The directive 
exempted entities subject to “equivalent”, group-level supervision by U.S. banking 
regulators.  Id. 
 43. See Coase, supra note 6; see also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 44. See DINO FALASCHETTI & MICHAEL J. ORLANDO, MONEY, FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION, AND GOVERNANCE 3 (2008). 
 45. See e.g., DINO FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: HOW ACCOUNTABILITY CAN GO TOO FAR IN POLITICS, LAW, AND BUSINESS 
70 (2009) [hereinafter FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE] (discussing the role of law 
in market efficiency); Dino Falaschetti, Can Lobbying Prevent Anticompetitive Outcomes? 
Evidence on Consumer Monopsony in Telecommunications, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
1065 (2008) (examining industry-specific regulation and the relationship between regulators 
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govern business associations, such as the fiduciary duties of directors, 
officers, and controlling shareholders, can free up resources from the acts 
of forming and enforcing agency relationships so that those resources may 
be put to work in more productive endeavors.46 
B. Regulation can Improve on Market Discipline when Transactions 
Costs are High 
This transaction cost approach has offered keen insights to how legal 
doctrines might become not only more internally consistent but also more 
productive.  The question about whether creditors should be able to pierce 
the corporate veil is illustrative.  From a transaction cost perspective, tort 
creditors should have more ready access to this equitable remedy than do 
contract creditors.  Indeed, limited liability is black letter corporate law, 
and contract creditors are parties to the transactions that fall within that 
law’s scope.  In cases where limited liability is not a mutually agreeable 
term, then, contract creditors would incur relatively little in the way of 
costs in bargaining around it.  Small businesses, for example, routinely 
forego limited liability in return for credit terms that are more attractive on 
net. 
Transactions costs that tort creditors must incur are considerably 
greater.  Notice that tort creditors, by definition, aren’t parties to 
“transactions” that harmed them.  Indeed, the cost of finding “suitable 
trading partners” to mitigate damages before the fact would be prohibitive.  
And Coase’s theorem tells us that this type of high transaction cost 
environment is where the law can improve upon private contracting by 
encouraging parties to a transaction to more fully internalize the costs and 
benefits of their actions.47 
The theorem has also been productively applied to developing 
regulations for pollution,48 and we essentially extend that development here 
to the case of “financial pollution”. 49  Market discipline is not enough to 
 
and producers in promoting market efficiency). 
 46. See, e.g., FALASCHETTI, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra note 45, at 119 
(discussing the economization of transaction costs arising from the use of managers, 
lawyers, and politicians); see generally Dino Falaschetti, Shareholder Democracy and 
Corporate Governance, 28 REV. BANK. & FIN. L. 553 (2009) (arguing for limits to the 
shareholder franchise in order to obtain maximal efficiency in corporate governance). 
 47. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1931-32 (1991) (discussing liberalized 
veil-piercing as merely another form of unlimited liability).  Hansmann and Kraakman are 
frequently credited with having developed this externalities-based approach to veil-piercing 
doctrines.  See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 141 
(2002). 
 48. See DAVID P. BARON, BUSINESS AND ITS ENVIRONMENT 363-66 (5th ed. 2006). 
 49. For a detailed discussion of the term, see Matthew Beville, Comment, Financial 
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stop inefficient pollution because it does not confront polluters with the full 
costs of their actions.  Instead, to the extent that firms can pass pollution-
costs onto others, cash flows that are available to the firms’ various 
claimants (direct parties to transactions with firms) will increase, and 
financial markets will thus reward firms for the negative externalities that 
they create.  In cases like this, regulation can do better from a social 
welfare standpoint. 
Systemic risk is such a case.  As Secretary Geithner observed in our 
introductory quotation, this risk refers to the potential for parties to a 
financial transaction to adversely affect those who are not party to the 
transaction.  But this problem is qualitatively identical to that of pollution:  
transactions amongst the firm’s various claimants ultimately produce 
pollution, the costs of which are passed (to a considerable extent) onto 
others.  Consequently, the potential for productive regulation here is 
considerable too.  For example, transactions costs will weaken the ability of 
decentralized markets to confront producers of systemic risk with the 
external costs of their actions. 
C. Although Regulation Can Do Better, It Will Not Necessarily Do So 
Transactions costs create opportunities for regulation to mitigate the 
systemic consequences of decentralized allocations.  However, challenges 
to effective regulation are not trivial.  Regulators must first determine those 
behaviors that are creating transactional externalities.  In the case of 
finance, time-varying macroeconomic conditions will determine who 
should be regulated, and when and how regulators can intervene most 
effectively.  While the merits of various regulatory proposals will continue 
to be debated, more timely information about the expected level of 
systemic risk would represent a touchstone on the regulatory landscape. 
Since 1993, international standards for regulating financial risks have 
trended towards greater flexibility.50   The evolving standards have 
acknowledged that optimal prudential regulation of deposit-taking 
institutions will necessarily vary across institutions and over time.  An 
 
Pollution: Systemic Risk and Market Stability, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245 (2008). 
 50. See Jean-Charles Rochet, Solvency Regulations and the Management of Banking 
Risks, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 981, 981 (1999) (“[Since 1993] . . . , a movement towards 
flexibility has been acknowledged, notably with validation of internal models of the VaR 
type and the precommitment proposal of Kupiec and 0’Brien.”).  For discussion of pre-
commitment proposal, see Paul H. Kupiec, & James M. O’Brien, The Pre-Commitment 
Approach: Using Incentives to Set Market Risk Capital Requirements (Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys., Finance and Economics Discussion Series No. 1997-14, 1997) 
(“Under the [pre-commitment approach], a bank sets its own market risk capital requirement 
with the knowledge that it will face regulatory penalties should its trading activities generate 
subsequent losses that exceed its market risk capital pre-commitment.”). 
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increment of leverage taken by one bank does not create the same systemic 
consequences as the same increment of leverage taken by another.  Thus, 
the international capital adequacy framework specified in the Basel II 
Accord provides a significant degree of discretion to national bank 
regulators and regulated institutions.51 
Nonetheless, many now argue that flexible standards are insufficient 
to discipline banks from excessive leverage when they also face incentives 
to take advantage of implicit governmental guarantees.52  Moreover, it may 
simply be impractical for a small number of regulators to manage the 
complexity of a regulatory regime characterized by flexible, bank-specific 
capital standards.53  In any event, even former advocates argue that self-
regulation of the financial industry may be an inadequate check on 
systemic risk.54 
If systemic considerations are the most consequential aspect of the 
crisis, however, then improvements in the regulation of individual banks 
can only address the problem indirectly.  Indeed, regulators have much 
further to go to improve the regulation of systemic risk.  Although systemic 
risk management is a principal objective of prudential regulation, capital 
requirements target individual bank risk, regardless of how they are 
devised.55  Regulatory efforts to address systemic risk more directly do not 
 
 51. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 2 
(2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf (“The revised Framework 
provides a range of options for determining the capital requirements for credit risk and 
operational risk to allow banks and supervisors to select approaches that are most 
appropriate for their operations and their financial market infrastructure.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., Remarks at the Risk 
Management and Allocation Conference (June 25, 2007), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spjun2507.html 
(discussing risks associated with flexible capital adequacy standards, as devised in Basel II). 
 53. See Coffee, supra note 42  (“Because each model was ad hoc, specifically fitted to a 
unique financial institution, no team of three SEC staffers was in a position to contest these 
individualized models or the historical data used by them. Thus, the real impact of the Basel 
II methodology was to shift the balance of power in favor of the management of the 
investment bank and to diminish the negotiating position of the SEC’s staff. Basel II may 
offer a sophisticated tool, but it was one beyond the capacity of the SEC’s largely legal staff 
to administer effectively.”). 
 54. Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit 
Crisis for the Future of Regulation: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Secs. & Exch. 
Comm’n), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20081023100525.pdf (“[W]here SEC 
regulation is strong and backed by statute, it is effective – and . . . where it relies on 
voluntary compliance or simply has no jurisdiction at all, it is not.”). 
 55. See Viral V. Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and 
Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 1, at 23-24 (observing that 
financial institutions will make efficient use of implicit and explicit guarantees in their 
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appear to have been effective in the present crisis.  For example, bank-level 
regulators had an incomplete view of the broader implications of an 
institution’s risk-taking, and there did not appear to be any systematic 
method for linking the results of individual examinations to potential 
systemic risks.56 
Policymakers have only begun to debate the merits of alternative 
approaches to implementing banking capital controls.  Regardless of what 
approach comes into favor, regulators will need to integrate the information 
learned through bank examinations and simulations for those efforts to also 
yield information relevant to managing systemic risks.  Consequently, a 
direct and forward-looking measure of systemic risk would be a valuable 
contribution to any new regulatory landscape. 
III. HOW INFORMATION MARKETS CAN HELP A SYSTEMIC RISK 
REGULATOR 
 Currently, systemic risk is only loosely regulated and regulations 
that do exist tend to lack rigorous theoretical underpinnings.  It should 
come as no surprise, then, that regulators have had a hard time anticipating 
systemic events, let alone productively addressing them before they are 
realized.57  A properly structured information market could improve 
regulatory capabilities on both margins.  To be sure, this market would not 
prevent systemic events by itself, nor would it directly stabilize fragile 
markets.  Rather, it would contribute, in real time, important information 
that is necessary to do so. 
If our proposed market indicates the economy is becoming 
 
investment decision-making). 
 56. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF 
REGULATORS’ OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, 
COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2009) (republishing testimony of Orice M. Williams, 
Dir., Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv. before S. Subcomm. on Secs., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. & Urban Dev.) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09499t.pdf 
(examining “(1) how regulators oversee risk management at [large, complex financial] 
institutions, (2) the extent to which regulators identified shortcomings in risk management at 
certain institutions prior to the summer of 2007, and (3) how some aspects of the regulatory 
system may have contributed to or hindered the oversight of risk management”). 
 57. See, e.g., Viral Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, supra note 1, at 283 (“Current financial regulations seek to limit each 
institution’s risk (for example market and credit risk) seen in isolation; they are not 
sufficiently focused on systemic risk.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 
193, 210-13 (2008) (noting current attempts to regulate systemic risk are “imperfect and 
messy”); Beville, supra note 49, at 255-60 (describing how Basel Accords may exacerbate 
financial crises).  The Obama Administration has recently proposed significant regulatory 
reforms that will provide for a systemic risk regulator, though at this stage, the proposal 
does not attempt to analyze systemic risk in great detail.  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
supra note 1; see also Hilsenrath, supra note 1. 
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systemically fragile due to the spillover of financial risk to the real 
economy, it will signal regulators to focus their attention at preventative 
measures as well as to prepare for any necessary intervention.  Though 
regulators have access to a number of economic indicators, our market may 
be useful because it attempts to measure the dimension a systemic regulator 
should be most interested in, that is, a measure of the spillover of financial 
risk.  However, to function as an early warning system, the contract must 
be written along a margin that measures the systemic risk present in the 
economy at any particular moment.  This requires a careful analysis of 
systemic risk and the dangers it poses.  Though not a perfect proxy, we 
believe that the correlation between finance dependent and independent 
firms provides a more direct measure the level of systemic risk present in 
the economy than is currently available.58 
 This section proceeds in three parts.  First, we show the benefits 
information markets may provide over traditional regulatory mechanisms 
and how these benefits are particularly important in the systemic risk 
context.  Second, we offer evidence that the correlation of returns from 
finance dependent and independent firms may indeed be a systemically 
important indicator.  Finally, we will show how an information market 
security, structured to reflect market-expectations of that correlation, would 
have performed over the past decade. 
A. Information Markets, Generally 
 Information markets rely on the efficiency of freely traded 
exchanges to accurately aggregate privately held information about current 
and future states of the world.59  Unlike traditional equity or debt markets, 
these markets trade contracts that pay a specified amount if a given 
condition obtains at the time the market closes.60  These contracts are 
 
 58. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 9, at 562-67 (describing measurement and effect 
of financial dependence). 
 59. Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets to Improve Public 
Decision Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 221 (2005) (“Markets are generally the 
best . . . mechanism for gathering and aggregating dispersed information from private, self-
interested economic agents.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS 
PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 118-21 (2006) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA] (discussing 
efficiency advantages of price system over central planning); Cass R. Sunstein, Group 
Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
962, 1023-25 (2005) [hereinafter Sunstein, Group Judgments] (noting that a price signal can 
aggregate “the information and the tastes of numerous people, producing judgments that 
incorporate more material than could possibly be assembled by any central planner, even 
one who insists on deliberation with and among experts”). 
 60. Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and 
Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 934 (2004).  The event or 
condition specified in the contract must, of course, be objectively verifiable.  Id. at 943.  
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written such that their prices aggregate a large number of individual views 
on the likelihood or wisdom of a particular decision.61  The price of each 
contract continuously fluctuates according to investors’ predictions of the 
likelihood of the outcome of a particular event; if more people believe the 
contracted event will occur, they will buy the contract, raising its price.62  
Conversely, if investors believe the event will not occur, they will sell or 
short the contract, driving the price downward.63  In one common market 
structure, contracts pay $1 if a specified event is realized; the contract’s 
market price therefore represents the consensus probability, of interested 
traders, at any given time that the event will be realized.64  These markets 
can produce remarkably accurate results:  they are generally more accurate 
than “public opinion polls, public experts, and private experts.”65 
 
Contracts have been written on a number of events including the outcome of elections, 
changes in the federal funds rate, and earnings for particular companies.  See, e.g., Iowa 
Electronic Markets, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2010); see 
also Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2007).  The Policy Analysis Market was 
a particularly interesting experiment designed to predict terrorist attacks and other 
“important events in the world.”  Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1028-29; see 
also Abramowicz, supra, at 982-87.  However, the project was cancelled after criticism that 
it allowed participants to profit from terrorist attacks; some critics were also concerned that 
terrorists could participate, and profit, by trading on their inside information about pending 
attacks.  Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1028-29; see also Abramowicz & 
Henderson, supra, at 1384 n.109. 
 61. So-called “conditional markets” can also be structured to predict the impact of an 
uncertain future event, such as the movement a company’s stock if it decides to merge with 
a competitor.  Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1353-54.  If the merger takes 
place, participants will be paid under the same conditions as a normal prediction market; if 
the merger does not take place, the market is “unwound,” and the invested funds are 
returned.  Id. at 53. 
 62. See Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and 
the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 46-47 (2006) (discussing supply and demand in 
context of prediction markets). 
 63. Id.  Some markets do not allow explicit short selling, but nearly all allow a 
functional equivalent.  For instance in binary markets, the prices of corresponding securities 
may be linked, such that the decision to buy or sell one security will affect the prices of its 
counterpart.  These contracts are written such that the prices of corresponding securities will 
always equal $1.  So, a decision to purchase a contract that pays off if the contracted event 
occurs will drive up the price of the contract, but it will drive down the price of the 
corresponding contract that will pay out if the contracted event does not occur. 
 64. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 18 (Anchor Books 2005) (2004). 
 65. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1346 (internal citations omitted); see 
also SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 113-16 (describing success of Google’s internal 
market to assist in corporate decision making).  The Google market is particularly 
noteworthy because not only did high prices on individual contracts correspond to 
successful projects, but the actual price corresponded nearly exactly with the probability the 
event would occur.  Id. at 115-16.  That is, projects that the market projected an 80% chance 
of success succeed roughly 80% of the time.  Id.  However, it is important to note that 
information markets “cannot predict what will happen; rather, they can only give us 
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 As an example, political futures, designed to predict election 
outcomes, are traded on the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) or Intrade, and 
these political futures often outperform the consensus from survey-based 
predictions.66  In the simplest versions, contracts are written for each 
candidate; if the candidate wins, the contract pays $1.67  The price of the 
contract therefore represents the market’s prediction of each candidate’s 
percentage chance of winning the election.68  A more nuanced variant of 
the political market attempts to predict the share of the popular vote each 
candidate will receive; instead of receiving $1 if the candidate wins, the 
“vote-share” contract pays “$1 multiplied by the proportion of the popular 
vote that the candidate received.”69  Though these contracts are relatively 
simple, the IEM “outperform[ed] polls 451 out of 596 times” from its 
inception until 2004.70  Further, IEM vote share contracts have predicted 
the distribution of the popular vote with an average error rate of only 
1.37%.71 
 1.  The Efficiency of Information Markets 
 Information markets owe their success to their ability to obtain and 
aggregate information that would be unavailable to any single analyst or 
regulator.72  People generally do not have strong incentives to disclose 
private information.  If privately held information is useful, and not public, 
disclosure may be privately costly, even though it provides public 
 
probabilistic predictions.”  Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 964.  While information markets 
are amazingly accurate predictors of future events, they are not infallible and may 
occasionally be subject to common misconceptions.  See infra part III.A.2. 
 66. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1030; Intrade, 
http://www.intrade.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2010); Iowa Electronic Markets, 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).  The IEM is run by the 
University of Iowa Tippie College of Business as a research and teaching tool and is 
currently one of the only legal, publically traded prediction markets in the United States.  
Iowa Electronic Markets, About IEM, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/about/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2010). 
 67. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1029-30. 
 68. Id. at 1029; Ryan P. McCarthy, Comment, Information Markets as Games of 
Chance, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 749, 750 (2007) (“Prices of shares in the market would indicate 
whether participants thought certain events were probable or improbable.”). 
 69. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1029; see also Abramowicz, supra 
note 60, at 944-45 (describing vote share contracts and discussing performance of the Iowa 
Electronic Markets during the 2000 presidential election). 
 70. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1030. 
 71. SUROWIECKI, supra note 64, at 18.  The market was off less than four percent for 
other U.S. elections and less than 2.5 percent in foreign elections.  Id. 
 72. This is, of course, identical to Hayek’s insight that markets are superior to 
government experts at allocating prices.  See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 118-21 
(discussing Hayek’s theories). 
BEVILLEFINAL 6/10/2010  10:51:09 AM 
866 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
benefits.73  For example, if a superior is personally invested in the success 
of a project, subordinates may be unlikely to truthfully disclose their 
personal estimates of the project’s success, thereby producing unreasonably 
optimistic predictions about the project’s success and leading to wasted 
resources.74  For instance, Best Buy has implemented a prediction market to 
evaluate the success of various corporate projects, which has proven more 
accurate than official forecasts.75  For instance, an early test asked 
employees to bet on the number of gift cards sold in a single month.76  The 
result, obtained primarily through trades made by low-level employees, 
significantly outperformed executive estimates, suggesting subordinates 
were unwilling or unable to truthfully or completely disclose their personal 
estimates up the corporate hierarchy. 
 Similarly, traditional predictions and decision-making are generally 
informed by the transmission of information through subordinates, polls, or 
relying on experts.77  Because a single analyst, regulator, or manager cannot 
possibly evaluate and incorporate every available fact, “distortions [can] 
occur when gatekeepers decide what information to present to their 
immediate superiors. . . .”78  This selective disclosure necessarily impedes 
“efficient information flow,” leaving some information unincorporated into 
final decisions or predictions.79 
 Information markets, however, provide participants with a strong 
incentive to honestly disclose privately held information on the contracted 
event.80  This attracts participants who can profit from sharing private 
 
 73. Id. at 67-70; see also Sunstein, Group Judgements, supra note 59, at 1024. As an 
example, consider the incentives facing a campaign insider with private information about 
the viability of his or her candidate’s campaign.  While professionally obligated to remain 
optimistic, especially in communications to the public, an insider may nonetheless disclose 
the impact of this information, and profit, by trading in political futures.  This provides the 
public with the benefits of disclosure, without forcing the insider to bear the costs. 
 74. See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1364 (“[P]rediction markets help 
avoid the danger that employees will keep information lest the information interfere with 
interpersonal relationships, reputation, or even job status; this is especially true if 
anonymous trading is permitted.”); see also SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 86-96 
(describing group pressures, such as reputation concerns, that tend to prevent individuals 
from truthfully disclosing private information). 
 75. Phred Dvorak, Best Buy Taps “Prediction Market”: Imaginary Stocks Let Workers 
Forecast Whether Retailer's Plans Will Meet Goals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at B1. 
 76. Id. at B8. 
 77. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1361; see also Abramowicz, supra 
note 60, at 981 (noting distorting effect of experts on traditional governmental decision-
making). 
 78. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1364-68. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 971 (noting that without financial incentives, 
people may vote or respond to polls according to their preferences instead of their true 
predictions). 
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information, which, through anonymous trading activity, provides better 
information than would otherwise be publicly available.  Further, 
information markets give participants an incentive to actively seek out new 
information and trade against misperceptions or biases in the market.81  
Individuals who recognize biases or common misperceptions can trade 
against those biases and “earn significant profits at the expense of other 
traders.”82  Such trading opportunities not only give participants the ability 
to “capture, rather than give to others, the benefits of disclosure,”83 but they 
also incorporate new participants’ information into the market price, 
providing the public the benefits of a more accurate prediction.84  This 
gives individuals with the best information the strongest incentive to 
participate, aligning the incentives of individuals with private information 
with the incentives of regulators or decision makers. 
Even if traditional methods of aggregating information allow 
individuals to successfully obtain all private information, they are generally 
unable to weigh individual predictions or discern which information is 
valuable.  However information markets can weigh valuable information, 
producing more accurate predictions.  First, participants are self-selected; 
as it is costly to participate in the market, individuals will not trade unless 
they feel they have some insight into the probability the contracted event 
will, or will not, occur.85  Second, individual trades will be “weighted by 
intensity of belief or knowledge.”86  Rational traders have the incentive to 
increase their investment proportionate to the quality of their information.  
 
 81. Id. (“Depending on the amount of money at stake, traders may even have an 
incentive to gather information not previously publicly available to better inform their 
trading decisions.”); Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1367 (noting participants 
“have incentives to identify and correct distorted information, especially if they can trade 
anonymously”). 
 82. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 138-40; see also Abramowicz & 
Henderson, supra note 60, at 1368-70 (“Those who are aware of others’ cognitive 
imperfections will recognize profit opportunities, and their trading should at least partially 
correct for biases.”).  These biases can take several common forms, such as the distortions 
caused by the availability heuristic, which leads people to overestimate the chances of rare 
events if they can easily recall such an event from the past.  See generally SUNSTEIN, 
INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 75-81 (discussing various biases that can affect individual 
predictions or decisions). 
 83. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 104. 
 84. See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1368 (“Individuals who might 
otherwise keep information to themselves nonetheless might trade on that information.”). 
 85. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1034 (noting that participants 
“must believe that they have relevant information; it is costly for them to ‘vote,’ and they 
probably will not do so unless they think that they have something to gain.”). 
 86. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1367; see also Sunstein, Group 
Judgments, supra note 59, at 1034 (“In addition, votes are not weighted equally. If people 
want to invest a few dollars, they are permitted to do so, but they can invest a great deal 
more if they are confident of their answer.”). 
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Though some participants will undoubtedly place large, incorrect bets, or 
try to manipulate the market, this activity may actually increase a market’s 
overall accuracy.87  As incorrect or opportunistic traders push the market 
price away from an accurate estimate of the probability of the contracted 
event, traders with private information have an incentive to enter the 
market or increase their investment, correcting the imbalance.88 
 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that an efficient market needs 
only a relatively small minority of informed traders to make accurate 
predictions.  For example, IEM predictions are driven by only fifteen 
percent of its participants; the remaining eighty-five percent do little to aid 
the market’s accuracy.89  This holds true even though the IEM is not a 
particularly thick market.  As of 2005, it had never had “more than eight 
hundred or so traders” and was disproportionately composed of men from 
Iowa.90  Yet as noted above, its predictions still outperform paid analysts 
and national polls.91  Thus, an information market can still produce accurate 
predictions as long as there is some minority of active, informed traders, 
irrespective of the fact that the trading population is not representative of 
the entire population of interested parties.92 
 Finally, traditional prediction methods will necessarily have some 
 
 87. See Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market 
Accuracy, 76 ECONOMICA 304, 305 (2009) (arguing that “by increasing the expected 
rewards to informed trading, a larger manipulator variance motivates other traders to gather 
information and so indirectly increases the accuracy of the market price as an estimate of 
fundamental asset value.”); see also Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1382 
(arguing that overconfidence should not affect market accuracy); Hahn & Tetlock, supra 
note 59, at 223 (noting that attempts at market manipulation can increase efficiency by 
encouraging individuals with private information to enter the market). 
 88. See Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 972-76.  Manipulation attempts create an 
obvious arbitrage opportunity for knowledgeable traders, so “as long as it is clear that a 
trader's activity has moved a security price away from its fundamental value, market forces 
should respond.”  Id. at 974. 
 89. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1035.  This minority of informed 
traders tends to make frequent trades and set their own buy or sell offers.  Id.  The remaining 
traders simply “hold onto their shares for a long period and then simply accept someone 
else's prices.”  Id. 
 90. SUROWIECKI, supra note 64, at 18-19; see also Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 957, 
977-78 (noting that IEM is not particularly thick, that relying on its last transaction price 
may be misleading, and that 1988 Presidential IEM predictions were still accurate despite all 
participants being “affiliated with the University of Iowa, including a disproportionate 
number of business students, producing a trading population that identified as Republican 
and favored George Bush somewhat more than the population as a whole.”). 
 91. See supra notes 66-71, and accompanying text. 
 92. Biased or unrepresentative trading populations can affect the accuracy of the 
market.  However, it seems that even in these situations, an information market can still 
outperform traditional prediction or cost benefit tools if it is relatively more objective, or 
immune from bias, than traditional prediction or cost benefit tools.  Abramowicz, supra note 
60, at 980-81. 
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lag between the time information is discovered and when it is incorporated.  
However, information markets allow participants to constantly trade, 
incorporating new information on an on-going basis.93  Thus, information 
markets not only give participants the right incentives to disclose private 
information, but also give participants with the strongest beliefs, and 
generally the best knowledge, the most influence over the prediction.94 
 2.  The Limits of Information Markets’ Potential 
 However, information markets will not work in all situations.  
Generally, “markets work well only when there is a great deal of dispersed 
information to aggregate.”95  Accordingly, markets will generally be poor 
predictors of events that are highly discretionary, such as Supreme Court 
appointments, or for which there is little information which participants can 
easily obtain.96  Information markets may also be subject to bubbles or 
speculative behavior, distorting their predictive abilities.97  Because 
contracts are freely traded, traders decisions are determined “not only that 
person’s belief in the fruition of the event, but also a guess about how other 
participants estimate the occurrence.”98  While we are confident that 
opportunistic traders will generally take the opportunity to bet against 
speculative bubbles, “[l]arge-scale errors are always possible . . . .”99 
 More serious problems can occur if markets cannot motivate traders 
to participate.  Information markets are often designed as zero sum games 
and people will not participate unless they expect to win money or find 
 
 93. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1035.   Thus, an information 
market is not a “static, one-time prediction but rather a dynamic system that can respond 
instantaneously to the arrival of new information.”  Id. (quoting Joyce Berg et al., Accuracy 
and Forecast Standard Error of Prediction Markets 7-10 & n.6-7 (July 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/archive/forecasting.pdf.).  Stated 
differently, information markets, like all publicly traded markets, are theoretically efficient 
and their price represents the aggregation of all available information at any given time.  See 
generally RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 135-81 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing efficient capital markets hypothesis).  
However, as described below, efficient markets are not perfectly efficient and may be 
subject to the same distortions or mistakes that affect other markets. 
 94. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1367. 
 95. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 135 (discussing failure of markets to predict 
Supreme Court nominees or whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction). 
 96. Id.  For example, prediction markets incorrectly predicted that Iraq had WMD 
before the 2003 invasion.  However, detailed or confidential information on Iraq’s classified 
weapons programs was generally unavailable.  The only possible traders were intelligence 
service personnel whose legal obligations likely precluded their participation in the market. 
 97. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1354. 
 98. Comment, Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
1217, 1222 (2009). 
 99. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 142. 
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trading entertaining.100  While this incentive is sufficient in many markets, 
it may not be enough if the event is fairly remote or the population of 
potential traders is small.101  Some markets have overcome this obstacle by 
subsidizing trades, effectively paying people to participate.102  Additionally, 
depending on the market, a market scoring rule “can encourage trading 
activity” by ensuring that early participants receive some payout.103  These 
rules provide that “after the initial prediction, anyone else can make a 
subsequent prediction, as long as the subsequent predictor in effect agrees 
to pay off the current predictor when the market closes.”104  While this rule 
is not ideal in all scenarios, it can overcome problems in particularly 
illiquid markets. 
B. An Information Market to Predict Systemic Risk 
 Though information markets can accurately aggregate information 
on the probability of an uncertain event, they have yet to see widespread 
use outside of internet wagers and academic experiments.105  However, the 
ability to obtain objective predictions on the possibility of uncertain events, 
or the wisdom of proposed regulations, could be clearly beneficial to 
regulators or legislators.  For our purposes, an information market could be 
used to indicate the level of systemic risk in the economy, which could then 
inform regulators when and how to allocate their limited resources.  While 
we anticipate that this market could be developed and managed by the 
Federal Reserve or the Treasury, a private organization could also sponsor 
 
 100. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1351.  That is, many markets are 
designed that the potential upside for winning traders equals the downside for losing traders. 
 101. See id. at 1352, 1356. 
 102. Id. at 1351 (noting that subsidies can be in the form of cash or in-kind payments).  
Further, Abramowicz and Henderson believe that subsidies can be scaled to the importance 
of the decision so that for especially important predictions, “individuals will have incentives 
not only to participate, but also to seek out relevant information and to develop sophisticated 
models of whatever is being predicted.” 
 103. Robin Hanson, On Market Maker Functions, 3 J. PREDICTION MARKETS 61, 63 
(2009); see generally Robin Hanson, Combinatorial Information Market Design, 5 INFO. 
SYS. FRONTIERS 107 (2003) (providing mechanics for market scoring functions). 
 104. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 959-60.  This encourages new entry because 
subsequent predictors “need only worry about coming up with a prediction that is likely to 
be better than that of the current predictor, but need not worry that a subsequent predictor 
will further refine his or her prediction.” 
 105. The Defense Department Policy Analysis Market, described above, was quickly 
abandoned.  See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1028.  Several corporate 
markets have been successful, but while the practice is growing, it is not yet widespread.  
See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 59, at 117 (noting that Google, Microsoft, Eli Lilly, 
Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and Hewlett Packard have all adopted corporation 
information markets in some capacity); Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 59, at 1349-
50 (describing Hewlett-Packard’s experimental market). 
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the market, leaving regulators and private firms to rely on the predictions at 
their own discretion.106 
  1.   Information Markets as Regulatory Mechanisms 
 Several commentators have attempted to show how information 
markets can effectively aggregate information to aid in decision-making, or 
more ambitiously, as a benchmark to control the outcome of particular 
decisions.107  Though agencies have not yet adopted these proposals, an 
information market could improve on current regulations where there are 
significant costs associated with aggregating information necessary to 
make informed policy decisions.108 
 Scholars have proposed two primary ways information markets can 
improve regulation.  First, normative markets have been suggested to serve 
as cost-benefit analyses for proposed regulations.109  In a normative market, 
participants try to predict whether an unnamed analyst, or analysts, would 
recommend a particular decision.110  Because the particular analyst is 
unknown, participants essentially substitute their own views about the 
wisdom of the proposed regulation; the resulting aggregation of views can 
serve as a form of cost-benefit analysis and determine if a course of action 
is worth pursuing.111  However, more applicable to the purposes of this 
Article, prediction markets can also be designed to estimate the probability 
of events that may affect regulatory decisions or responsibilities.112  
Scholars have already proposed information markets to monitor risk in the 
financial system.  Michael Abramowicz has proposed FDIC sponsored 
markets to estimate the number of insured banks expected to fail in a 
 
 106. An educational institution could also sponsor this market, much like the IEM.  See 
infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of the practical considerations associated with 
sponsoring an information market. 
 107. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 936-39; see also Abramowicz & Henderson, supra 
note 60, at 1390 (noting that information markets can be used to determine the effect on 
stock price of particular corporate decisions, potentially constraining directors’ actions). 
 108. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 962.  If the costs of aggregating information are 
small, it is unlikely an information market will significantly improve on agency decisions.  
However, in situations where the costs of aggregating information are high, an information 
market may provide significant improvements on current approaches.  Id. 
 109. See id. at 938 (noting their advantage over positive information markets in this 
area); Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 59, at 224 (proposing to expand on the Abramowicz 
approach). 
 110. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 938-42 (“The market would be considerably more 
useful if the eventual decisionmaker were unknown, because the market prediction would 
then reflect an expectation of what an average decisionmaker would decide.”). 
 111. Id. at 939.  However, these markets may be biased if participants expect the final 
analyst will be biased or somehow lack complete information about the attractiveness of the 
proposal. 
 112. Id. at 988-89. 
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particular year or the chance of insolvency for particular institutions.113 
   Regulatory information markets may provide idiosyncratic benefits 
above and beyond the inherent benefits described above.114  A primary 
benefit of an information market is that it introduces a level of 
accountability to agency decisions.  Information markets are theoretically 
objective; that is, predictions produced through an information market 
represent the aggregation of the best available information on the 
contracted event, absent any ideological interpretations or distortions.115  
Though individual markets or traders may be biased, it appears information 
markets are at least less subjective than traditional decision making 
processes and offer a relative advantage over feasible competitors.116  This 
objectivity is, of course, not omniscience; however, the ability to reference 
concrete market predictions would lend agency decisions a level of 
accountability otherwise unattainable.117  Information market cost-benefit 
analyses could be used to check political pressures or the influence of 
interests groups.118  Conditional markets, which predict that proposed rules 
would produce significant efficiency gains and provide an “objective 
reflection on an agency's decision make[] it easier to separate the claimed 
and real justifications” for particular policies.119  The information market 
would provide agencies’ predictions some legitimacy, and help defuse 
accusations that their decisions are politicized or that the stated reasons for 
a rule is merely a pretext for political gain.120  Similarly, information 
markets could hold agencies accountable for their policy decisions and 
provide an incentive not to use the rulemaking process for political ends. 
 Information market objectivity can similarly ensure regulators take 
into account and properly weigh all available information.  Though the 
ability to aggregate information is an inherent property of information 
markets, it may take on special significance when used in the regulatory 
context.  Regulators often overreact to recent crises by enacting overly 
burdensome regulations.121  People tend to judge the chance of rare events 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra Part III.A. 
 115. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 964; see also SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 60, 
at 106 (noting “prediction markets have been found not to amplify individual errors but to 
eliminate them . . . .”). 
 116. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 981.  Further, this advantage is “likely to be greatest 
where talk is cheapest.”  Id. 
 117. Id. at 964; see also Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 59, at 263-64 (linking increased 
transparency on key decision-making parameters with stronger accountability). 
 118. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 966-71. 
 119. Id. at 970. 
 120. Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 59, at 264 (“Greater transparency could also reduce the 
scope for political manipulation.”). 
 121. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 966-67.  For example, fear of possible pesticide 
contamination in a small canal in upstate New York created a nationwide panic about toxic 
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“by asking whether examples come readily to mind . . .”; accordingly they 
will overestimate the risk that recent crises will reoccur.122  This availability 
heuristic may lead regulators to under-regulate prior to crises and over-
regulate in their immediate aftermath.123  This propensity is likely to be 
increased if constituents are alarmed or outraged and demand some 
regulatory response.124  However, a properly structured information market 
may be able to inform regulators that an issue is overblown, despite popular 
concern. 
 For example, the EPA regularly has to decide issues which, 
depending on their resolution, could harm either particular industries, and 
economic efficiency, or the environment.  These decisions are often highly 
contested by business and environmental groups, and fraught with 
accusations that the agency has been captured by interest groups.125  A 
market could be structured either to predict a regulation’s effects on both 
the affected industry and environment or as a normative market, to judge 
whether the proposed regulation would be beneficial.  Ambitiously, this 
market could be used to decide whether the proposed rule should be 
implemented; however, even the modest suggestion of using markets to 
verify agency impact statements could increase transparency and improve 
policy decisions. 
 This objectivity would be particularly helpful in the context of 
systemic risk.  Systemic risk is difficult to measure, as the necessary 
information is widely dispersed, and its definition has proven somewhat 
amorphous.126  More importantly, there may be political pressures that 
 
waste sites, which culminated in the creation of the Superfund toxic waste remediation 
program.  See Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 691-98 (1999).  Though later research showed that 
neither the original contaminated site, nor toxic waste sites in general, pose any significant 
health risks, nearly $14 billion has been allocated to the Superfund program.  Id. at 694-97. 
 122. Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 991. 
 123. Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 966. 
 124. Id. at 966-67 (describing effect of “availability cascades” where “an event leads 
individuals to overestimate a risk, in turn affecting public discourse, which then exacerbates 
the initial overestimation”). 
 125. Businesses and property owners often challenge regulations that fail to properly 
weigh their interests, or unfairly place environmental interests above their personal or 
economic needs.  See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (finding ranchers had 
standing to challenge Fish and Wildlife Service decision to keep reservoir levels high, 
limiting water available for downstream commercial uses).  On the other hand, the Bush 
administration was routinely accused of placing business interests above environmental 
concerns.  See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management 
in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249 (2005) (criticizing use of scientific 
rhetoric to justify politically motivated environmental regulations); James Glanz, Scientists 
Say Administration Distorts Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18. 
 126. Beville, supra note 49, at 246 (quoting John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial 
Intermediation, and Systemic Risk, 13 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2007)). 
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weigh against correctly identifying or correcting a systemically unstable 
economy.  Because recognizing, and correcting, systemic instability is 
politically and economically costly, regulators have an incentive to allow 
the financial system to increase risk-taking in the hopes the crisis will 
resolve itself.127  If a crisis does occur, the losses will often be put to future 
officials and taxpayers.128  However, if the crisis is avoided, regulators 
avoid having to make politically unpopular decisions.  Thus, at the 
regulatory level, reform may be costly individually, while failure will be 
socially catastrophic, but blame will not fall on any particular politician or 
regulator. 
 Many commentators warned that the implicit guarantee given to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac created a moral hazard problem for 
secondary market investors.129  However, Fannie and Freddie were 
politically powerful and provided popular services to a number of political 
constituencies.130  Reforming Fannie and Freddie would have required 
immense political capital and would have been individually risky; allowing 
the firms to fail diffused responsibility throughout the government, despite 
coming at a much higher social cost.  Similarly, it appears that the Federal 
Reserve’s loose monetary policy may have also contributed to the crisis; 
excessively low rates created excess demand for loanable funds, while 
simultaneously forcing investment firms further down the yield curve.131  
 
 127. Cf. FALASCHETTI & ORLANDO, supra note 44, at 128-31 (discussing deposit 
insurance during the savings and loan crisis). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., Dwight Jaffee et al., What to Do About the Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises?, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 1, at 124-28; Richard Scott 
Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 
565 (2005); Robert A. Eisenbeis et al., An Analysis of the Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and an Evaluation of the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2006-2, 2006), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0602.pdf. 
 130. See, e.g., Carnell, supra note 129, at 592-93 (describing how agencies responsible 
for overseeing GSE’s were particularly susceptible to regulatory capture); Editorial, Fannie 
Mae’s Political Immunity, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2008, at A16 (criticizing influence of 
GSE’s over Congress). 
 131. See, e.g., Editorial, Geithner’s Revelation, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at A16 
(interviewing Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner); John B. Taylor, Op-Ed., How 
Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19; John B. 
Taylor, Professor of Econ., Stanford Univ., and Senior Fellow, Hoover Inst., Systemic Risk 
and the Role of Government, Dinner Keynote Speech at the Conference on Financial 
Innovation and Crises for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (May 12, 2009), 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/CONFEREN/09fmc/taylor.pdf; see generally Marcus Miller 
et al., Moral Hazard and the US Stock Market: Analysing the Greenspan Put, 112 ECON. J. 
C171 (2002) (arguing that the Fed created moral hazard by cutting interest rates and 
increasing liquidity during periods of market instability); Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance 
Made the World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 499 (2006) (describing the incentive to 
increase risk taking caused by low interest rates). 
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Though the Fed is relatively well insulated from political pressures, it may 
have been unwilling to increase low interest rates during a boom economy 
for fear that it would be politically unpopular or impair economic growth.  
Congress and the Treasury may have been unwilling to challenge low rates 
for the same reasons.  Thus, even if we assume that regulators had all of the 
necessary information to make the correct decisions prior to the crisis, they 
still may have rationally avoided taking the necessary steps to protect the 
economy.  If an information market can objectively aggregate information, 
it may be able to improve on regulation by forcing regulators to confront 
politically unpopular realities.132 
 2.   A Proxy for Systemic Risk 
While we have shown how information markets can potentially 
improve on existing regulations generally, an information market is only 
useful to predict the level of systemic risk if we develop a theoretically 
strong benchmark of the level of systemic risk in the economy at any time.  
We believe the correlation between finance dependent and finance 
independent industries is a more sensitive indicator of systemic risk than a 
contract which simply pays upon the occurrence of a systemic event.  
Because systemic events occur so infrequently, such a market is unlikely to 
accurately measure the continuing level of systemic risk.  Moreover, 
market based mechanisms will only measure private costs and benefits and 
not the systemic externality.  However, the correlations upon which we 
build our model are a logical consequence of systemically important third 
party effects of risk spillover.  By attempting to measure the spillover of 
risk, instead of the perception of whether a systemic event will occur, our 
market can provide a real time measure of how much systemic risk is 
present in the economy at any given time. 
Unlike traditional information market contingencies, systemic risk is 
difficult to empirically verify and sufficiently rare to make ad hoc 
predictions challenging.  Thus, proposals that attempt to measure the 
chance of systemic failure directly will likely prove too shortsighted to 
allow regulators to address systemic problems before they materialize.133  
For instance, Xin Huang, Hao Zhou, and Haibin Zhu propose a systemic 
risk indicator that relies on the correlations of daily trades and the price of 
 
 132. See Sunstein, Group Judgments, supra note 59, at 1042 (noting information markets 
might provide a “reality check” on regulatory deliberations). 
 133. For example, we could modify Abramowicz’s solvency market proposal, and write 
contracts attempting to estimate the direct probability of a systemic event over the specified 
timeline.  See Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 988-89.  Indeed, it appears this type of market 
would be less sensitive than our proposed measure.  See infra notes 180-181 and 
accompanying text. 
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credit default insurance for major financial institutions to predict the level 
of systemic risk.134  While this measure would undoubtedly be sensitive to 
systemic risks, it would not be able to accurately measure it.  Because 
systemic events are so rare, participants would have little incentive to trade 
in such a market unless they believed a systemic event was imminent, far 
too late to be useful to regulators.135  Thus, market prices of heavily traded 
securities reflect the price at which parties are willing to trade and are not a 
direct estimation of the systemic risk being created at any given time.  For 
instance, the prices of credit default swaps reflect only the terms on which 
parties will exchange the risks associated with a particular default event; 
the effect such a default will have on third parties is not incorporated into 
the price.  Similarly, these markets may be distorted by predictions of 
financial sector risk which does not necessarily correspond to systemic 
risk.136  Thus, measures dependent on existing securities will not reflect the 
social costs and benefits that reflect the efficiency of a Coasean regulatory 
framework. 
As we have discussed above,137 systemic risk is the unpriced risk not 
borne by parties to financial transaction, imposed on third parties, and 
bearing a structural similarity to environmental pollution.138  While we do 
 
 134. Xin Huang et al., A Framework for Assessing the Systemic Risk of Major Financial 
Institutions (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 281, 2009), at 3, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work281.pdf?noframes=1 (“Our main contribution is to propose to 
use a new indicator to assess the systemic risk of the banking sector: the price of insurance 
against large default losses in the banking sector in the coming 12 weeks.”).  Though this 
market is not a proper information market, it can be considered functionally equivalent 
because it relies on the aggregating properties of highly traded markets to extract 
information about the likelihood particular firms will default on their outstanding debt.  Id. 
at 2. 
 135. Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, supra note 98, at 1233-36 
(“Investment in catastrophe markets would be so high risk that individuals may not bet at 
more than novelty levels, like participation in a lottery. With the chance of winning so 
slight, participants may not have a sufficient incentive to educate themselves and purchase 
according to the confidence of their prediction.”).  Indeed, it appears that our proposed 
market is more sensitive than the CDS indicator proposed by Huang et al.  See infra notes 
181-182 and accompanying text.  Further, though regulators and market participants did not 
have access to the precise indicator Huang et al., suggest, CDS prices were readily available 
during the subprime crisis and were not a sufficient indication of the economy’s fragility. 
 136. Cf. Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1362-63 (“Any number of firm-
specific or market-wide developments can thus be expected to affect the stock price in ways 
that may be difficult to unpack from the particular event being analyzed.”).  That is, a 
market dependent on financial sector CDS prices or failure of banking institutions will be 
sensitive to any changes in financial risk; however, we are only concerned with increases in 
financial risk that spills over to the real economy, introducing a significant amount of noise 
to systemic risk predictions. 
 137. See supra Part II.B. 
 138. Beville, supra note 49, at 246.  Firms only price the internal costs and benefits of 
any particular transaction.  Id.  Thus, firms may find it internally advantageous to enter into 
transactions which create costs they do not have to fully bear.  See id.  If these risks 
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not have a strong understanding of the mechanics of systemic risk, 
systemic events have two common characteristics:  first, by definition, 
financial risks begin to spillover and effect third parties to financial 
transactions; second, this causes seemingly unrelated events to become 
highly correlated.139  However, instead of attempting to develop a pathway-
dependent measure of systemic risk, we develop a reduced form measure of 
systemic risk that directly estimates the spillover of financial risk into the 
real economy. 
 We develop this model by extending Rajan and Zingales’ distinction 
between finance dependent and finance independent firms, which was used 
to measure how financial sector performance affected economic growth 
across jurisdictions with differing levels of financial development.140  Rajan 
and Zingales attempted to measure the direction of causation between 
financial sector performance and financial growth.141  While economists 
were confident that financial development was highly correlated with 
economic growth, there was no consensus on whether increased financial 
development led to economic growth, or if strong financial systems 
developed to support strong economies.142  Rajan and Zingales’ insight was 
to distinguish finance dependent firms, those firms that rely heavily on 
external finance to fund their operations, and finance independent firms, 
which rely primarily on operating cash flow, and compare returns across 
time and jurisdictions.143  They hypothesized that if “financial development 
affects economic growth” then “financial development should 
disproportionately help firms (or industries) typically dependent on 
external finance for their growth.”144  That is, because a developed financial 
system “reduces the cost of external finance by improving disclosure and 
information dissemination,”145 improving financial market performance 
 
materialize, they will threaten the stability of the financial system and affect the real 
economy.  Id.  For instance, while it may have been individually rational to invest in 
subprime mortgage securities, it left the entire system vulnerable to a negative housing 
market.  See id. at 253-61. 
 139. See Viral Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY, supra note 1, at 283 (describing systemic risk as the spillover of financial risk to 
the real economy); Beville, supra note 49, at 246 (noting “systemic risk can be generally 
defined as the risk that a negative shock to a firm or asset will result in losses or failure 
across the financial system”); Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 200-01 (noting systemic risk is 
positively correlated with the market and cannot be diversified away). 
 140. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 9. 
 141. Id. at 559. 
 142. Id. at 559-60. 
 143. Id. at 563-67.  Rajan and Zingales provide a continuum of industries and their 
relative dependence on external finance.  Pharmaceutical companies are the most finance 
dependent, while tobacco firms are the least finance dependent. 
 144. Id. 
 145. RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE 
CAPITALISTS 111 (2003). 
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should lower the cost of capital for finance dependent firms, improving 
their performance relative to firms that rely primarily on operating cash 
flows.146  As economists were already confident in the positive relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, this pathway would 
provide evidence of a “specific mechanism by which finance affects 
growth, thus providing a stronger test of causality.”147 
 Their findings were significant:  in high growth countries, with 
highly developed financial sectors, finance dependent industries 
significantly outperformed finance independent industries; in countries 
with underdeveloped financial systems, finance dependent industries 
significantly underperformed compared to finance independent 
industries.148  This suggests not only that improving financial performance 
promotes economic growth but that certain industries should be more 
correlated with financial performance, while others should generally be 
immune to financial risk.149 
 These findings were robust along several dimensions.  Recent 
entrants generally do not have established cash flows and must 
disproportionately rely on external finance, relative to their particular 
industry.150  As suggested by the model, the effect of financial development 
was even greater on these firms, suggesting “[f]inancial development could 
indirectly influence growth by allowing new ideas to develop and challenge 
existing ones.”151  Rajan and Zingales also use accounting standards as a 
proxy for financial development and compare the aggregate growth rate of 
the three most independent and dependent industries.152  In countries 
“below the median in accounting standards, the residual growth rate of the 
three least-dependent industries is positive, while the residual growth rate 
of three most-dependent industries is negative;” in countries above the 
median in accounting standards, the “pattern reverses.”153 
 The distinction between finance dependent and finance independent 
firms may be particularly useful to understanding systemic risk.  Systemic 
risk, by definition, is the materialization of risks imposed on third parties 
through financial transactions, and in times of systemic stress, it will affect 
 
 146. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 9, at 560 (“This would imply that, ceteris paribus, an 
industry such as Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, which requires a lot of external funding, 
should develop relatively faster than Tobacco, which requires little external finance, in 
countries that are more financially developed.”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 579. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 576. 
 153. Id. 
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the economy as a whole.154  Thus, in times of systemic stress, firms with no 
ties to the financial sector should find themselves subject to the same 
systematic stresses as financial firms and their counterparties.  Finance 
dependent firms, which rely heavily on external finance, contract regularly 
with financial firms, thus exposing them to the same risks as the financial 
sector.  However, firms that do not rely heavily on external finance rarely, 
if ever, contract with financial firms and should be relatively immune to 
financial sector risk. 
 If this hypothesis is true, the correlations of returns for finance 
dependent and independent firms may provide a measure of how much risk 
is spilling over from financial transactions and is affecting normally 
independent third parties at any point in time.  During normal conditions, 
the returns of the financial sector should be somewhat correlated with 
finance dependent firms, but uncorrelated with finance independent firms.  
However, as systemic risk increases, the performance of finance 
independent firms should become subject to financial sector risks, 
increasing the correlation between the finance independent and dependent 
sectors.  That is, as systemic risk increases, finance independent firms 
should begin to behave like finance dependent firms.  Accordingly, the 
correlations of returns between finance dependent and independent 
industries should be a rough measure of systemic risk in the economy at 
any point in time. 
 While this correlation alone may provide some utility to regulators, 
an information market can allow our correlation to function as an early 
warning system.  The correlation alone only measures systemic risk on a 
rolling basis; however, an information market which aggregates 
information on the expected movement of this correlation can provide a 
prediction of the level of systemic risk in the market at some point in the 
future.  First, an information market will be able to provide a reliable 
forward-looking prediction of the movement of this correlation over time.  
While a running correlation, over some fixed time period, will give 
regulators a good picture of the systemic risk present in the system at any 
given time, the prediction market will provide regulators with information 
about whether they should prepare for a substantial increase in systemic 
risk or whether the chances of a systemic event remain remote.  Second, an 
information market will force regulators to realistically address market 
conditions.  Market participants may also proactively rely on this measure 
to limit their exposure or unwind risky positions; firms may also increase 
their monitoring of the credit markets beyond their counterparties in an 
attempt to identify firms with the potential to create or exacerbate financial 
contagion.  As discussed above, there is some concern that even if 
 
 154. Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 198-201; Beville, supra note 49, at 246. 
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regulators know how much systemic risk is present at any time, they may 
have an incentive to provide overly optimistic assessments of the state of 
the economy.  An information market provides an incentive to confront 
systemic risk early, as optimistic or pessimistic pronouncements can be 
checked against the information market’s predictions.  If official statements 
are consistent with information market predictions, then regulatory 
recommendations or actions will carry more authority than official 
pronouncements alone.  Conversely, officials will need to substantially 
buttress any recommendations or actions that are inconsistent with the 
prediction market to avoid appearing biased or politically motivated. 
 If our proposed market does reliably indicate the level of systemic 
risk in the economy, regulators and market participants would be able to 
plan for and react to systemic crises before they materialize, significantly 
mitigating losses.  For instance, if the market predicts that systemic risk 
will increase substantially over the next six months, regulators, such as the 
Federal Reserve, can begin to increase bank examinations and attempt to 
determine if a particular firm or asset is posing a systemic threat.  If a 
central regulator identifies the threat, it can take steps to mitigate the risks 
and prevent a systemic event.  For instance, a regulator could require firms 
to post additional collateral, provide liquidity or credit backstops, or 
otherwise reduce exposure to the affected market or firms.  Further, the 
regulator could provide liquidity or credit guarantees itself, purchase assets 
outright, or takeover troubled entities before they collapse.  If these 
measures work, regulators should be able to prevent illiquidity or 
insolvency in one firm or market from spreading, thus quarantining losses 
and mitigating the effects of a systemic threat.  Additionally, the mere 
presence of a systemic risk indicator may facilitate more effective self 
regulation in market participants.  If firms monitor the movement of our 
proposed market, they can anticipate regulatory action and respond 
accordingly.155  This ability to proactively respond before a crisis 
materializes would be a beneficial addition to the list of tools currently 
available to regulators. 
Conversely, if the systemic indicator was mistaken, the costs would be 
fairly low.  It is possible that the correlation we suggest may be subject to 
other common pressures, and reasons other than systemic risk could cause 
the correlation of returns between finance dependent and independent 
returns to increase.  In such a scenario, a regulator would likely initiate 
increased scrutiny of the financial sector to determine if it was susceptible 
to a systemic event.156  While the cost of bank examinations may be high, it 
 
 155. Indeed, investors and firms routinely behave similarly in other contexts.  Firms 
monitor inflation forecasts to anticipate changes in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. 
 156. This of course assumes that regulators have the political incentives to address the 
problem, even if our market indicates systemic instability. 
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will not have any adverse affect on economic productivity.  Thus, while an 
information market would not directly prevent systemic events, it places no 
ex ante restrictions on financial performance or innovation, and the costs of 
false positives would be minimal.  Given the potentially huge costs 
involved in regulating systemic risk, an information market is a low cost 
solution that could significantly reduce the harm associated with systemic 
events. 
 3.   Efficiently Regulating Systemic Risk 
 Regulation can only improve on market outcomes if it reduces 
transaction costs that would otherwise prohibit mutually beneficial trades.  
Our reduced form model helps illuminate the transaction costs involved in 
bargaining over systemic risk.  Functionally, systemic risk is financial risk 
imposed on firms without the ability to contract away their exposure.  
When the correlations between the finance sector and finance independent 
firms are small, finance independent firms have few incentives to bargain 
over financial risk.  However, during these periods, finance dependent 
firms have an interest in limiting their exposure to financial risk, and there 
are few obstacles standing in the way of these transactions.  However, 
finance independent firms do have an incentive in bargaining over systemic 
risks.  As systemically risky activity causes these correlations to increase, 
finance independent firms become increasingly interested in mitigating 
their exposure to financial risks, but they lack the ability to do so.  Because 
they are independent from the financial sector, finance independent firms 
will face insurmountable transaction costs, preventing them from 
bargaining away their exposure. 
 In these situations regulation can improve on market outcomes by 
mitigating or preventing financial risks from affecting the real economy.  
This can be done by forcing financial firms to increase capital requirements 
during periods of increased systemic risk or by requiring highly leveraged 
firms to begin unwinding transactions before a negative market event.157  In 
some scenarios preemptive bailouts or capital guarantees may be required.  
However, even if government intervention increases moral hazard and 
encourages future risk taking, it is important to realize that systemic risk is 
imposed on innocent third parties, who lack, even conceptually, the ability 
to transact away their exposure to the financial sector during periods of 
high systemic correlations. 
 
 157. There is some danger that regulatory intervention may actually set-off a systemic 
crisis.  For instance, forcing firms to sell assets may spark a fire sale, depressing prices, 
reducing liquidity, and potentially forcing firms to sell off unrelated assets to maintain 
capital requirements.  Ideally, a regulator would rely initially on market based intervention 
and only resort to more extreme measures when truly necessary to avoid systemic collapse. 
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 4.  Advantages Over Competing Proposals 
 Current proposals to regulate systemic risk appear costly and 
potentially ineffective.  Further, many of these proposals threaten 
investment firms’ intellectual property, providing a disincentive to develop 
unique or innovative investment strategies.  Several commentators, 
conscious of these difficulties, have called for the creation of a market-
based measure of systemic risk, which could act as an early warning 
system.158  We believe our proposed information market is well adapted to 
this role and can significantly improve on systemic risk regulation without 
the costs associated with other proposals. 
 The defining feature of our proposed information market is that it 
attempts to directly measure the aspects of systemic risk that regulators 
should be most concerned about.  Furthermore, its theoretical parsimony 
gives it a distinct advantage over more ambitious proposals.159  Developing 
efficient regulatory responses to systemic risk is difficult;160 the pathways 
by which financial risk affects the real economy are not well understood.  
Moreover, discovering and monitoring these pathways is expensive and 
time consuming; by directing bank examiners’ attention to periods of high 
systemic instability, they can devote their scarce resources more 
productively.  Similarly, though commentators believe systemic risk arises 
from a negative externality caused by inefficient incentives guiding 
financial actors’ behavior, there is no consensus on regulation that can 
force firms to internalize the costs of their actions and prevent the 
consequences of these actions from affecting unrelated third parties.161  An 
 
 158. See e.g., Alan Greenspan, Fmr. Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., Remarks at the Journal of Financial Services Research and the American Enterprise 
Institute Conference, in Honor of Anna Schwartz, Remarks on Systemic Risk (June 3, 
2009), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/Greenspan%20-%20Speech%20-final.pdf 
(“Such evidence of failure is common to every crisis and points up the broader problem that 
forecasting the onset of financial crisis, except by chance, has always proved to be beyond 
our reach.”); see also sources cited supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
 159. That is, our model tries to explain “‘a lot’ with ‘a little.’”  Cf. FALASCHETTI & 
ORLANDO, supra note 44, at 10-11 (describing characteristics of a good economic model).  
Though we may lack confidence in the precise mechanics of how systemic risk affects the 
larger economy, our data indicates we can have some confidence in the measure of that 
effect.  Id. at 11-12 (discussing reduced form evidence).  That is, regardless of how systemic 
risk spills over into the real economy, we know how that spillover will affect the correlation 
between finance dependent and independent firms. 
 160. Id.; See supra Part II.C. 
 161. Some commentators have proposed a tax on systemically risky assets.  See Viral 
Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 1, 
at 293-94 (proposing an “additional systemic risk fee to all financial institutions”).  Others 
have suggested regulating financial sector compensation to reduce the incentives individual 
traders have to maximize short term gains in return for immediate compensation.  See 
Deborah Solomon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Eyes Bank Pay Overhaul, WALL ST. J., May 13, 
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information market allows us to propose a reduced form model of systemic 
risk and ignore the mechanics of risk spillover.  By limiting our inquiry to 
the correlation of returns between finance dependent and independent 
sectors, our proposal does not have to make difficult estimations such as 
the effects of particular investment decisions, asset bubbles, or 
compensation practices on financial stability.  While this leaves room for 
future research to determine the exact pathways by which systemic risk 
affects the economy, this information is not necessary to formulate 
effective policy prescriptions. 
 Indeed, pathway-dependent regulations, such as systemic taxation 
policies and compensation reforms, will likely prove insufficient to protect 
the economy against future instability.  While systemic risk may be caused 
by misaligned incentives, it appears unlikely to manifest itself along 
identical dimensions in the future.  For instance, while it may make sense 
to reform the mortgage lending industry on its own merits, it will likely do 
little to reduce systemic risk.162  Mortgage lenders, investment banks, and 
ratings agencies now have information on how subprime mortgages 
perform in declining housing markets, making a similar crisis less likely.  
Moreover, increased regulatory scrutiny of structured financial products 
may allow risk to accumulate in a more loosely monitored market.  This 
does not guarantee systemic stability but rather makes it more likely that 
the next systemic event will arise from an unexpected market or firm that 
may not neatly track the lessons learned from this crisis.  Indeed, it is 
impossible to eliminate the incentive to export costs to third parties and for 
regulatory reforms to prevent every channel through which third party 
effects may travel.  This suggests that relying too heavily on technical 
proposals to limit systemic risk may end up regulating around the problem 
or leaving significant gaps from which a new systemic crisis could 
develop.163  However, because we remain agnostic on the precise 
mechanisms through which systemic risk travels, our proposal is robust to 
these considerations. 
 Though regulation is never costless,164 we should be particularly 
 
2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124215896684211987.html 
(noting demand for “legislation that could strengthen the government's ability both to 
monitor compensation and to curb incentives that threaten a company's viability or pose a 
systemic risk to the economy”).  Some proposals focus on regulating or banning derivatives, 
such as credit default swaps. Gretchen Morgenson, Time to Unravel the Knot of Credit 
Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at BU1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/25/business/25gret.html. 
 162. See Beville, supra note 49, at 247 (“Subprime defaults served only as a trigger 
event for an endogenous response that amplified losses across the market.”). 
 163. Cf. Beville, supra note 49, at 265 (describing how Basel capital requirements 
legislate around misaligned incentives and fail to reduce systemic risk). 
 164. See generally Coase, supra note 5. See also Beville, supra note 49, at 261 
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wary of expensive or onerous proposals when the benefits are uncertain.  
While systemic risk is real, “it is important to note that the ideal level of 
systemic risk is not zero.”165  Over-regulating systemic risk will negatively 
affect economic activity by deterring or prohibiting firms from maintaining 
sufficiently risky portfolios and by providing incentives for talented traders 
to defect to less regulated or better paid industries.166  This could impair 
economic efficiency by leading firms to under-invest in risky ventures and 
stifling innovation and productivity.  Similarly, giving the most talented 
individuals an incentive to leave the financial sector is unlikely to increase 
financial stability. 
 Because identifying the margins upon which systemic risk can be 
successfully regulated is difficult, the costs imposed by prohibiting 
otherwise beneficial trades may easily overwhelm whatever benefits a 
proposed regulation provides.  However, information markets are relatively 
inexpensive, and they encourage an efficient allocation of a regulator’s 
scarce resources.  Regulators can increase bank examinations and other 
resource-intensive functions during times of systemic stress, precisely the 
time when their resources will be the most productive.  Similarly, a 
regulator can reduce its spending during periods of relative stability.  A 
functioning market only needs a website, a secure server, and algorithms to 
price contracts and disperse funds at expiration.167  Even if our proposed 
market required subsidies to induce trading volume, these costs would 
likely be offset by the risk of over-deterring legitimate business activity.168  
Further, though subsidies are needed only to increase liquidity in thin 
markets; as we will discuss below, our proposed market is structured to be 
sufficiently liquid to avoid the need for subsidies.  Thus, an information 
market is a strong “next best” proposal to limit systemic risk in the absence 
 
(“However, regulation is not costless, and the decision to impose liability or proscribe 
conduct will also impose costs elsewhere in the market.”). 
 165. Beville, supra note 49, at 273, citing Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors 
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial 
Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm (stating that the 
cost of eliminating systemic risk would stifle productivity). 
 166. See e.g., David Weidner, The Perils of a Smaller Wall Street, WALL ST. J., June 25, 
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124584871445047245.html (noting that limiting size 
of banks may reduce their competitiveness, hindering economic activity). 
 167. See Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 59, at 266-67.  This assumes that we establish a 
zero-sum market, where the prices of related securities are linked.  See Bell, supra note 62, 
at 55-56.  The IEM employs a similar mechanism to ensure that it never loses, nor makes, 
money.  See Abramowicz, supra note 60, at 948. 
 168. Abramowicz and Henderson imagine that a large corporate market might require 
several million dollars worth of subsidies.  While expensive, these costs would be dwarfed 
by costs of even deterring a tiny percentage of productive investment activity.  See 
Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1351 
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of a clear understanding of how to force firms to internalize the systemic 
costs of their decisions. 
 Finally, an information market would not endanger firm’s 
intellectual property in the way ongoing bank examinations or other 
onerous inspection requirements might.  Financial innovation depends on 
developing proprietary investment strategies; like any form of intellectual 
property, investment strategies are non-rivalrous and can be adopted by 
anyone if disclosed.169  This not only gives competitors the advantage of 
innovative strategies without investing in talented traders or market 
research, but may also reduce spreads as more firms attempt to exploit the 
same opportunity.170  Thus, if systemic risk regulation increased disclosure 
of these strategies, it would reduce the incentive to innovate, harming 
financial development.  One of the most elegant aspects of the information 
market is that it allows participants to disclose the effect their private 
information has on the perceived probability of the contracted event 
without disclosing the particulars of that knowledge.  This protection of 
proprietary investment strategies may also help align financial sector 
interest groups with legislative interests.  If investment firms are convinced 
their intellectual property will be protected, they are likely to be more 
willing to support regulatory reform. 
C. A Model Systemic Risk Prediction Market 
 Our proposed contracts are straightforward and intuitive.  We are 
attempting to judge the spillover of financial risk into the real economy—
systemic risk at its most basic level.  We should, theoretically, be able to 
measure the level of systemic risk in the economy by comparing the 
correlation of daily returns of companies traditionally heavily dependent on 
external finance and firms that generally have operating cash flows 
sufficient to meet their capital needs.  To test this hypothesis we use the 
daily returns of pharmaceutical and tobacco firms, the industries most and 
least (respectively) dependent on external finance, according to Rajan and 
Zingales.171  As we will demonstrate below, this pattern appears to be 
supported by the data and is robust. 
 This section first writes and explains the contracts that could be 
 
 169. John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic Risk, 13 
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2007) (“[T]he success of a hedge fund often depends on 
proprietary trading strategies that, if made public, can be used by others to trade against 
them.”).  See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 10-17 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (discussing the problem of protecting 
intellectual property). 
 170. As the demand for an asset increases, its price will rise or its interest rate will drop, 
reducing returns. 
 171. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 9, at 566-67. 
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traded in our proposed information market.  Then, we show that Rajan and 
Zingales’ findings are consistent with our hypothesis and that the returns of 
finance independent firms appear independent from the financial sector.  
Finally, we use this data to show what our proposed market might have 
successfully predicted over the past decade. 
 1.   The Contracts 
Our market could be implemented with a number of different 
contracts.  The precise language of the security is not particularly relevant 
as long as it elicits private information from market participants.  For 
example, a simple contract could aggregate the market’s predictions about 
whether the correlation between finance dependent and independent firms 
will increase over a specified period.  A more nuanced contract, similar to 
the vote share contracts described above, could be written to predict what 
that correlation will actually be over the specified time period. 
To determine the correlation between the pharmaceutical and tobacco 
sectors we rely on the daily returns of the Dow Jones Pharmaceutical Index 
(DJUSPR) and the Dow Jones Tobacco Index (DJUSTB).  These indices 
are composed of a portfolio of industry specific firms and provide a more 
reliable estimate of industry wide performance.  Indices will also, of 
course, minimize the impact of any single firm in our calculations.  While 
these indices provide an easy way to test our hypothesis, these particular 
industries are not essential to our findings.  For example, future researchers 
may attempt to develop synthetic indices based on the 50 or 100 most 
dependent and independent publicly traded firms.  The contracts in this 
proposed market could read as follows: 
Prediction that Tobacco:Pharma Correlation Increases:  This contract 
pays $1 if the correlation between the Pharmaceutical Tobacco indices 
increases over a specified time period. 
Prediction that Tobacco:Pharma Correlation Decreases:  This contract 
pays $1 if the correlation between the Pharmaceutical and Tobacco indices 
decreases over a specified time period. 
Threshold Prediction:  This contract will pay $1 if the correlation 
between the Pharmaceutical and Tobacco indices exceeds 0.50. 
 These contracts could be written to predict the movement of our 
correlation over any period of time.  For example, a regulator may wish to 
create a long term contract to measure the level of systemic risk over the 
next year, or perhaps even longer, while relying on shorter term contracts 
to predict the level of systemic risk for the immediate future.  These 
contracts could also be created several periods in advance to give regulators 
an extended view of the instability present in the market.  This will provide 
regulators with an idea of the market’s long or medium term view of 
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systemic risk without sacrificing the utility of discrete predictions over 
relatively short periods. 
 Using a shorter time frame may also increase liquidity in the market.  
As the contract terms come to an end, it will often become obvious whether 
the correlation will increase or decrease, causing more traders to enter the 
information market.  As it becomes clear which way the correlation will 
move, the riskiness of the contracts decreases.  Participants with less 
information should enter the market, driving the contract price toward its 
expected payout.  This should provide sufficient liquidity to encourage 
disclosure of private information without requiring subsidies or market 
scoring functions.172  Similarly, a six-month time frame is not so extended 
that traders will be discouraged from participating.173 
 2.   Supporting Data 
 It appears that Rajan and Zingales’ finance independent firms are 
relatively independent from the financial system.  The returns of firms that 
rely heavily on external finance appear highly correlated with returns for 
the financial sector, indicating that they share many common risks.  
Similarly, as Rajan and Zingales’ theory would predict, the returns of 
finance independent firms are normally only loosely correlated with the 
returns of the financial sector, indicating that they are not subject to the 
same pressures.  However, during periods that have been characterized as 
systemic events, it appears that the “spillover” of financial risk into the real 
economy actually occurs, significantly increasing the correlations of returns 
between finance independent firms and the finance dependent firms. 
 This data was collected by comparing the correlations of daily 
returns of financial, pharmaceutical, and tobacco indices.174  These 
correlations were measured over six month intervals, excluding dates that 
the indices were not traded.175  These indices were chosen because, under 
 
 172. While this is not guaranteed, subsidies appear to be necessary only in markets with 
a limited number of participants or with a technical subject matter.  For instance, 
Abramowicz and Henderson believe that subsidies may be necessary to evaluate whether 
proposed corporate decisions or transactions will have positive or negative effects on a 
firm’s stock price.  Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 60, at 1351.  The sort of 
calculation required to make informed decisions in these markets may discourage entry 
absent some sort of subsidy.  However, our market appears relatively easy to understand.  
Further, because the outcome should become clear over time, it should induce even 
relatively unsophisticated traders to participate. 
 173. See id. at 1380 (noting that traders may be hesitant to trade in markets when the 
payout is distant). 
 174. This data was compiled from the daily returns of Dow Jones sector indices: Finance 
(DJUSFV), Pharmaceuticals (DJUSPR), and Tobacco (DJUSTB). 
 175. Explicitly, we measured the correlation between the Dow Jones Pharmaceutical and 
Tobacco indices over the first two quarters of the fiscal year, October 1st through March 
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Rajan and Zingales’ framework, pharmaceuticals are the sector most 
heavily dependent on external finance, while tobacco companies are the 
least dependent on external finance.176  By focusing on industries at 
opposite ends of the continuum, the resulting correlation should produce 
the clearest measure of systemic spillover possible.  Table 1 shows the 
correlation between the target sectors over the entire time period studied in 
this Article.  As is evident from Table 1, the pharmaceuticals share a fairly 
high correlation with the financial sector, while tobacco’s correlation is 
fairly low.  The correlation between tobacco and pharmaceuticals is, as 
would be expected, close to the average of the correlations of each sector 
with the financial sector. 
 
TABLE 1 
Daily Return Correlations:  2Q2000 through 1Q2009, (full sample) 
 
 Financials Pharmaceuticals Tobacco 
Financials 1.00 0.51 0.29 
Pharmaceuticals 0.51 1.00 0.39 
Tobacco 0.29 0.39 1.00 
 
 As tobacco firms rarely have to resort to external sources to meet 
their financial demands, they have relatively little direct interaction with 
the financial sector; these firms will generally be third parties to financial 
transactions.  Pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand, require 
intensive research and development, which must generally be funded 
through capital markets; these firms regularly transact with the financial 
sector and can bargain over financial risk with their counterparties.  The 
result is that, in normal scenarios, pharmaceutical companies are subject to 
the same risks that affect the financial sector, while tobacco companies are 
generally immune. 
Table 2 supports this inference.  Between the second quarter of 2000 
and the second quarter of 2007, a period which appears to have generated 
little systemic risk, the correlation of returns between the financial and 
tobacco sectors was only 0.20; however the return between the 
pharmaceutical and financial sectors was double that at 0.41.  The 
correlation of returns of the pharmaceutical and tobacco sectors was 0.27.  
This relationship is fairly weak, indicating that during systemically stable 
periods, the performance of finance dependent firms creates little spillover 
to third parties. 
 
 
31st, and the second two quarters of the fiscal year, April 1st through September 30th. 
 176. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 9, at 565. 
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TABLE 2 
Daily Return Correlations:  2Q2000 through 2Q2007 
 
 Financials Pharmaceuticals Tobacco 
Financials 1.00 0.41 0.20 
Pharmaceuticals 0.41 1.00 0.27 
Tobacco 0.20 0.27 1.00 
 
 However, during periods of systemic stress, finance independent 
firms become more strongly correlated with the financial sector.177  
Between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009, the period 
associated with the current financial crisis, the correlation of returns of the 
tobacco and pharmaceutical indices increase nearly threefold, consistent 
with our expectation that third parties will become increasingly affected by 
financial transactions during periods of high systemic stress.  As seen in 
Table 3, the correlations of the individual indices against the financial 
sector are also consistent with our predictions. 
 
TABLE 3 
Daily Return Correlations:  3Q2007 through 1Q2009 
 
 Financials Pharmaceuticals Tobacco 
Financials 1.00 0.67 0.51 
Pharmaceuticals 0.67 1.00 0.75 
Tobacco 0.51 0.75 1.00 
 
 As our model predicts, during times of systemic stress, the tobacco 
sector, which is the most finance independent industry, becomes highly 
correlated with the performance of the pharmaceutical sector, which is 
extremely dependent on external finance.  Stated differently, during periods 
of high systemic risk, the returns for finance independent firms begin to 
behave like finance dependent firms, suggesting that both are subject to 
common risks or pressures.  Because we have some certainty that the 
current crisis is a result of financial risk, it appears that our model tracks 
our intuitions on the nature of systemic risk.  During periods of relative 
 
 177. During these periods the correlations between finance dependent firms also 
increase, but by less than the increase affecting finance independent firms.  This makes 
intuitive sense if we see external finance as a necessary, but not sufficient, component for 
finance dependent firm performance.  If the cost of external finance limits finance 
dependent firms’ performance, they will be subject to common pressures and be relatively 
correlated.   However, if external finance is relatively cheap, firms will be less correlated as 
other idiosyncratic, or business specific, factors will have a larger impact on finance 
dependent firms’ returns. 
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stability, third parties are generally unaffected by financial risk; however, 
as systemic risk increases, the performance of finance independent firms is 
driven closer to the performance of finance dependent firms.  Thus, by 
encouraging interested individuals to divulge their expectations on the level 
of financial pollution in the future, we can develop an early warning system 
for periods of high systemic risk. 
 Further, our model appears to be consistent across time.  In Table 4 
below, we track the correlation of returns for the tobacco and 
pharmaceutical industries over six month intervals from the second quarter 
of 2000 through the third quarter of 2009.  The correlation of returns tracks 
our intuitions about the level of systemic risk over the last decade. 
 
TABLE 4 
Correlation of Daily Returns DJUSPR:DJUSTB 
 
Date Correlation
03/31/09 0.81 
09/30/08 0.65 
03/31/08 0.56 
09/28/07 0.66 
03/30/07 0.32 
09/29/06 0.30 
03/31/06 0.42 
09/30/05 0.44 
03/31/05 0.33 
09/30/04 0.35 
03/31/04 0.24 
09/30/03 0.17 
03/31/03 0.18 
09/30/02 0.25 
03/29/02 0.26 
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09/28/01 0.38 
03/30/01 0.49 
09/29/00 0.14 
 
 As our model would predict, the correlation of returns is low 
through much of the decade, consistent with a low level of systemic risk.  
From 2000-2007, the economy was booming and we would expect, fairly 
stable.  However, the correlation of returns markedly increased after the 
second quarter of 2007 and remained elevated through the first quarter of 
2009, consistent with our understanding of the progress of the financial 
crisis.  This data also suggests that our model can, in at least some 
scenarios, anticipate periods of high systemic risk.  Our data indicates that 
our correlation would have predicted an increase of systemic risk several 
months before Bear Stearns’ hedge funds failed and more than six months 
before the investment bank failed completely.178  An information market 
may have provided an even earlier prediction of systemic instability, 
alerting regulators to the systemic implications of these events.  This 
information may have led regulators to increase bank examinations or 
capital requirements before the crisis reached its peak, giving regulators the 
ability to reduce the resulting costs to third parties. 
 Though it was unclear at the time, the collapse of the Bear Stearns’ 
funds was the first sign that the mortgage market was collapsing and that a 
large number of financial firms were overexposed to asset backed securities 
and related derivatives.179  Yet, it appears our market would have predicted 
an increase in systemic risk even before this initial shock; though the 
contract would have ended after the Bear Stearns funds filed for 
bankruptcy, the information market would have likely signaled that 
systemic risk was increasing.  Indeed, this prediction would have been 
helpful even after the Bear Stearns funds collapsed.  The market did not 
anticipate the collapse of the mortgage market, and even fewer people 
 
 178. Bear Stearns’ High Grade Structured Credit Strategies and High-Grade Structured 
Credit Strategies Enhanced Leveraged Funds hedge funds first posted losses on June 14th 
2007, and filed for bankruptcy two months later.  Timeline of a Crisis, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, 
March 17, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB120576387418941803.html.  To be clear, 
we are not directly interested in the failure of Bear Stearns or its hedge funds.  However, 
these failures provide important data points when evaluating the predictive abilities of our 
model, as many experts believe that these were the first events of the financial crisis. 
 179. Viral Acharya et al., Prologue: A Bird’s-Eye View, in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY supra note 1, at 2 (“While subprime defaults were the root cause, the most 
identifiable event that led to systemic failure was mostly likely the collapse on June 20, 
2007, of two highly levered Bear Stearns-managed hedge funds. . . .”). 
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believed it would lead to a full blown financial crisis.  Even the Federal 
Reserve underestimated the gravity of the crisis; in July 2007, Chairman 
Bernanke estimated that there would only be $50 to $100 billion in “losses 
associated with subprime credit products.”180  Thus, our information market 
could have provided an indication that the mortgage market problems 
posed a systemic risk, prompting faster reactions from the financial sector 
and financial regulators. 
 Further, as predicted, our correlation model appears more sensitive 
and more accurate than Huang, Zhou, and Zhu’s CDS indicator.  While 
movements in the CDS price model roughly correlated with our measure of 
systemic risk, it did not respond to the subprime crisis until after the Bear 
Stearns funds collapsed.181  Further, the CDS indicator dropped 
dramatically after JP Morgan purchased Bear, while our model continued 
to anticipate a high level of systemic risk, consistent with the subsequent 
failure of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, and AIG.182  It 
appears our intuitions regarding systemic risk were correct; markets that 
attempt to directly measure systemic events require such a high level of 
instability to induce trading that their predictive abilities are limited.  
Moreover, CDS contracts appear to measure only the price at which parties 
will trade the costs and benefits of a particular default and not the systemic 
externality with which we are truly concerned. 
 There is also a smaller increase in the correlation of returns between 
September 2000 and March 2001, which tapers off over the following year.  
It is not immediately clear what caused this increase, though the most 
obvious possibility is the wave of accounting scandals in the early part of 
the decade may have undermined firms’ confidence in the ability of their 
counterparties to repay.183  However, regardless of the cause of this 
 
 180. Federal Reserve’s Second Monetary Policy Report for 2007: Hearing Before S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 19 (2007) (statement of Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg696/pdf/CHRG-110shrg696.pdf.  By March, 
2008 this estimate was revised upward to $400 billion. Greg Ip, Study Finds Wider Impact 
of Mortgage Losses, WALL ST. J., March 1, 2008, at A2.  In February 2009, the International 
Monetary Fund predicted that total losses associated with the credit crisis would exceed $2.2 
trillion. Steve Lohr, Ailing Banks May Require More Aid to Keep Solvent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
12, 2009, at A1. 
 181. See Huang et al., supra note 134, at 17 (noting the CDS indicator “rose sharply” 
after August 2007); see also id. at 39 (showing a graph of the CDS risk indicator). 
 182. Id. at 17. 
 183. See George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk: Lessons 
from Recent Events, ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Third Q. 2000, at 9, 15, available at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/documents/3
qep2.pdf (describing how lack of confidence in counterparties can lead to systemic 
instability).  In this sense, an accounting scandal would reduce confidence in counterparties 
through the same mechanisms as a negative asset shock; unsure who was affected, firms 
would refuse to lend at reasonable, or any other rates, causing credit markets to freeze up.  
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increase, it highlights another benefit of our proposed market.  We care 
about predicting susceptibility to systemic events, not necessarily the 
events themselves.  While this uptick could be the result of a coincidental 
increase in the correlation of returns, it would not be prohibitively costly to 
increase bank examinations during these periods.  If the increase in 
correlation turned out to be coincidental, there would be few negative 
consequences.  However, if the increased examinations uncovered 
conditions susceptible to a systemic event, regulators could address the 
situation before it materialized. 
 Finally, as a robustness check, we track our systemic risk indicator 
against the number of times systemic risk appeared in both the Wall Street 
Journal and the LexisNexis “Major Newspapers” database.184  Though this 
certainly does not establish a causal relationship, it does indicate that 
during periods we identify as having high levels of systemic risk, financial 
analysts were also discussing systemic risk.  Similarly, it also indicates that 
during the periods we identify as stable, financial analysts were, by and 
large, unconcerned with systemic events.  These results are reproduced in 
Table 5 below. 
 
TABLE 5 
Number of Mentions of Systemic Risk 
 
DATE WSJ MAJOR PAPERS 
10/1/2008-
4/31/2009 
86 468 
4/1/2008-9/31/2008 52 218 
10/1/2007-
3/31/2008 
21 86 
4/1/2007-9/31/2007 16 77 
10/1/2006-
3/31/2007 
15 51 
4/1/2006-9/31/2006 11 35 
 
See id. (explaining how uncertainty can cause credit markets to freeze). 
 184. This table was produced by searching for “systemic risk” in the LexisNexis Wall 
Street Journal and Major Newspapers databases over six month intervals. 
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10/1/2005-
3/31/2006 
9 32 
4/1/2005-9/31/2005 15 39 
10/1/2004-
3/31/2005 
5 17 
4/1/2004-9/31/2004 5 21 
10/1/2003-
3/31/2004 
6 26 
4/1/2003-9/31/2003 2 19 
10/1/2002-
3/31/2003 
8 45 
4/1/2002-9/31/2002 3 39 
10/1/2001-
3/31/2002 
5 48 
4/1/2001-9/31/2001 5 22 
10/1/2000-
3/31/2001 
6 31 
4/1/2000-9/31/2000 7 41 
 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 Though we have shown how an information market employed to 
predict systemic risk can improve economic performance, its 
implementation raises some practical concerns.  Information markets are 
fairly new, and their legality is not clearly settled.  While we anticipate our 
market would be developed and managed by a regulatory body, it could 
also be sponsored by a non-agency private or public entity.  Each 
possibility raises distinct issues, which are discussed below. 
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 Private information markets currently operate in a form of legal 
limbo.  They are neither clearly prohibited by state gambling laws nor 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(the “CFTC”) but are similar enough to regulated subject matter to stifle 
innovation.185  The only major public market in the United States is the 
IEM, which obtained a no-action letter from the CFTC allowing it to 
operate for “academic and experimental purposes” without being subject to 
CFTC regulation; in concession, the IEM was required to limit trader 
accounts to $500 or less.186  While the IEM is highly successful despite the 
account limitations, the CFTC is under no obligation to treat subsequent 
markets with the same generosity.187 
 However, even absent a no-action letter, it is not clear whether our 
proposed information market would be subject to CFTC regulation.188  The 
CFTC regulates the sales of commodities, including options, futures 
contracts, and some derivatives.189  Most information market contracts are 
 
 185. See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 61, at 1379 n.94 (describing uncertainty 
about whether gambling or commodity futures trading regulations apply). 
 186. CFTC Staff Letter No. 93–66 [1992–1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 25,785 (June 18, 1993). 
 187. Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of 
Markets for Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 174-75 (2002). 
 188. Professor Bell argues that information markets deal in spot transactions and not 
futures contracts; accordingly, he argues, they are not commodities at all, but securities.  See 
Bell, supra note 62, at 54-56 (comparing information and securities markets).  His analysis, 
however, relies on characteristics of information markets that are shared with option 
contracts and other instruments which can be described as commodities without arousing 
controversy.  Further, the CFTC appears to disagree with Bell’s arguments and has 
concluded that information market contracts are at least nominally commodities.  See 
Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. 
25669, 25671 (May 7, 2009) (describing what qualifies as a commodity).  Given the 
CFTC’s broad discretion to interpret the Commodity Exchange Act, arguing that 
information markets are not commodities markets is unlikely to be successful.  See Bell, 
supra note 187, at 176 (noting that the decision to regulate information markets would be 
protected by Chevron deference); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (holding courts should defer to agency decisions 
within the scope of their delegated authority if “the regulatory scheme is technical and 
complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the 
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies” (internal citations omitted)). 
 189. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2006) (“The term ‘commodity’ means wheat, cotton, rice, 
corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum 
tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed 
oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, 
soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, 
and all other goods and articles, except onions as provided in section 13–1 of this title, and 
all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the 
future dealt in.”).  “Contracts for future delivery” has been read expansively to cover most 
options on securities.  See id. § 1a(26), (32) (defining “option” and “security futures 
product”). 
  The Commission lacks complete jurisdiction over a narrower category of contracts 
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at least nominally commodities, as they are “designed to exhibit the 
attributes of either options or futures contracts.”190  However, the 
Commodity Exchange Act excludes or provides jurisdiction over certain 
kinds of contracts.  First, the CFTC has only limited jurisdiction over 
commodities that are derived from “any economic or commercial index 
based on prices, rates, values, or levels that are not within the control of 
any party to the relevant contract, agreement, or transaction.”191  While our 
proposed contract is clearly based on an economic index, excluded 
commodities are only exempt to the extent they are traded by institutional 
or qualified investors.192 Though a successful market need not be 
particularly thick, limiting eligible participants to institutional investors 
would be unlikely to result in the disclosure of sufficient private 
information to produce accurate predictions. 
 If a private sponsor wanted to ensure the legality of its market, it 
could attempt to register with the CFTC as a derivatives transaction 
execution facility or contract market.193  However, the registration 
requirements are somewhat onerous; the CFTC requires minimum capital 
for registered markets and provides for ongoing disclosure obligations.194  
 
known as hybrid instruments.  A hybrid instrument is “a security having one or more 
payments indexed to the value, level, or rate of, or providing for the delivery of, one or more 
commodities.”  Id. § 1a(21).  While Bell believes that information markets could fall under 
this exclusion, it appears exceedingly unlikely.  See Bell, supra note 62, at 68-71 (explaining 
hybrid instrument exclusion).  To be considered a hybrid security, an instrument must be 
either an equity security, debt security or a “demand deposit, time deposit or transaction 
account . . . offered by an insured depository institution,” 17 C.F.R. §§ 34.2(a), 34.3(a)(ii) 
(2009).  Our proposed market is clearly not an equity or debt security, nor is it likely to be 
offered by a secured depository institution, unless sponsored by the Federal Reserve. 
 190. See Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 25670 (requesting public comment on appropriate agency treatment of 
information markets and similar contracts). 
 191. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(13)(iii). 
 192. See id. § 2(d) (excluding from CFTC jurisdiction certain derivative transactions 
between institutional and qualified investors); see also id. § 1a(12) (defining eligible 
contract participants).  While retail investors can conduct trades through futures commission 
merchants, which are generally eligible contract participants, excluded commodities must be 
traded on a “principal-to-principal basis.”  See id. § 1a(20) (defining “futures commission 
merchant”); id. § 2(d) (excluding from CFTC jurisdiction certain derivative transactions 
between institutional and qualified investors); id. § 7(d) (outlining the responsibilities of the 
board of trade, including the enforcement of rules against abusive practices, that apply only 
toward market participants); see also Bell, supra note 187, at 177 (describing process by 
which scientists and educated lay people could trade through futures commission 
merchants). 
 193. See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (providing requirements for designating boards of trade as contract 
markets); id. § 7a (providing requirements for derivatives transaction execution facilities). 
 194. See id. § 6f (providing registration, financial, and risk assessment requirements for 
futures commission merchants and introducing brokers); id. § 6g (providing recording and 
record keeping requirements for futures commission merchants and introducing brokers); id. 
§ 7 (detailing requirements for designating boards of trade as contract markets); id. § 7a 
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Further, while the requirements to establish a derivatives transaction 
execution facility are less onerous, they are also limited to transactions with 
qualified investors.195  However, retail investors can trade on derivatives 
transaction execution facilities through futures commission merchants.  
Thus, if the registered exchange operated exclusively through registered 
merchants, retail investors would have access to our proposed market.  
However, it is unclear whether an information market can generate 
sufficient trading volume to justify the regulatory costs associated with 
registered exchanges.  Accordingly, a private market would ideally receive 
a no-action letter or be adopted by an existing market where the regulatory 
costs could be absorbed by higher margin or volume exchanges.  As a final 
note, the CFTC has solicited comments regarding future rulemaking and 
apparently is considering clarifying its stance on information markets.196  
Though the Commission has yet to issue its proposed rule, some 
commentators believe it will endorse publicly traded event contracts.197 
 However, these concerns would be mooted if the Treasury or 
Federal Reserve decided to sponsor the market.  Federal government 
sponsorship would preempt any state gambling laws which may otherwise 
prohibit information markets.  Similarly, while a government sponsored 
market would likely conform its market to CFTC standards, there would be 
no question of its legality.  However, it isn’t immediately clear the Fed has 
the authority to sponsor an information market.  For instance, the Fed 
prohibits regulated depository institutions from funding both “lotteries,” 
which is likely defined broadly enough to cover information markets, and 
internet gambling.198  However, neither of these prohibitions appears to 
 
(detailing registration requirements for derivatives transaction execution facilities); id. 7a-1 
(detailing registration requirements for derivatives clearing organizations); see also 17 
C.F.R. § 1.17 (providing minimum capital requirements for futures commission merchants 
and introducing brokers). 
 195. See 7 U.S.C. § 7a(b)(3) (limiting traders in derivatives transaction execution 
facilities to “eligible contract participants” and individuals trading through futures 
commission merchants with assets exceeding $20 million); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) 
(limiting definition of “eligible contract participant” to financial institutions, broker-dealers, 
and similar institutional investors or individuals with assets exceeding $10 million, or $5 
million if the commodity is being used as a hedging strategy). 
 196. See Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 
73 Fed. Reg. at 25673-25674 (requesting public comment on appropriate agency treatment 
of information markets and similar contracts). 
 197. Ricky McRoskey, Regulation Looms for Prediction Markets, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, 
July 8, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2008/db2008073_533950.htm?ch
an=top+news_top+news+index_news+%2B+analysis. 
 198. See 12 U.S.C. § 339 (prohibiting state member banks from sponsoring lotteries); 12 
C.F.R. § 233.1—.7 (applying provisions of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act of 2006 to institutions regulated by the Federal Reserve).  Lottery is defined to include 
any arrangement where three or more parties “advance money or credit to another in 
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limit the Fed’s permissible actions.199 
 It seems the best avenue for allowing the Fed to implement an 
information market is through the Federal Advisory Council.200  The 
Federal Advisory Council is composed of members of the Federal Reserve 
districts and has the authority to “call for information and to make 
recommendations” related to monetary policy, reserve requirements, and 
open-market operations.201  It seems an information market fits squarely 
within the Council’s right to call for information.  Further, the predictions 
produced from our market would certainly be relevant to the Council’s 
recommendations.  Additionally, current law may permit an information 
market if it is explicitly tied to the Fed’s ability to impose emergency 
reserve requirements on depository institutions.202  The Fed has the ability 
to set general reserve requirements for financial institutions; however it 
also has the right to impose additional reserve requirements in emergency 
situations.203  Thus, the Fed may be able to structure our proposed market 
for the purpose of informing its decision to impose emergency reserves.  As 
a final note, the Obama Administration’s plan considerably expands the 
Federal Reserve’s authority, including the mandate to directly monitor 
systemic risk.  However, while these proposed reforms explicitly authorize 
the Fed to collect information regarding systemic risk, they do not appear 
to resolve the uncertainty over whether the Fed may manage a prediction 
market. 
 
 
 
 
 
exchange for the possibility or expectation that one or more but not all of the participants . . 
. will receive by reason of their advances more than the amounts they have advanced.”  12 
U.S.C. § 339(c).  This includes arrangements where the “winners” are determined by “any 
record or tabulation of the result of one or more events in which any participant has no 
interest except for its bearing upon the possibility that he may become a winner.”  Id. 
 199. Which is not to say that the Fed is authorized to sponsor an information market but 
only that it is not specifically prohibited from creating one. 
 200. 12 U.S.C. § 262 (2006). 
 201. Id. §§ 261-262. 
 202. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.5 (describing the Fed’s ability to impose additional reserve 
requirements). 
 203. A decision to impose emergency reserve requirements requires the consensus of at 
least 5 Board members, who must then confer with “the appropriate committees of 
Congress.”  Id.  It appears these committees must only be consulted; congressional approval 
is not necessary.  Id. 
